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THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE,
INCORPORATED: A BLUEPRINT
FOR REFORM
Stanley Siegel*
several generations, the United States Post Office has been
the textbook demonstration of the inefficiency of the government in business. To some, the solution to its problems lies only
in turning over its functions to free enterprise. A more constructive
and politic approach is to inquire whether a structural arrangement
falling somewhere between that of a governmental department and
that of a privately owned business would permit the Post Office to
achieve some of the efficiencies of private enterprise without compromising the most essential elements of public responsibility. This
approach has been given new timeliness by the proposal of Postmaster General O'Brien to convert the Post Office into a public
corporation.
It is hardly surprising that the Founding Fathers did not establish
the Post Office as a public corporation. Even as a device for the accumulation and management of private wealth, the corporation was
then in its infancy. Since that day, the United States has witnessed
not only the development of large private corporations to perform
public service functions-the railroads, power companies, and telephone companies-but has also gained experience with public corporations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). This experience has been complemented by developments in other nations,
such as Great Britain, in the use and management of public corporations.
Through all this accumulation of experience and administrative
science, the United States Post Office has slumbered like an enchanted princess in the outdated mold of its eighteenth century
creation. It is the purpose of this article to inquire into the deficiencies of the Post Office and to consider whether a basic structural
change would permit it to fulfill more completely and more efficiently its critical functions.
Complaints about the Post Office Department are as diffuse as
they are frequent and strident. Criticism cannot be sharpened, and
ordered attempts at reorganization are not possible, without a clear
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understanding of the Department's present problems and the roots
of these problems.1
It is fair to say that at least in recent years some progress has been
made in most areas of the Department's operations. More mail is
moved2 than at any previous time in its history. 3 Mechanization has
proceeded, wages have been increased, and steps have been initiated
to infuse top-level talent into the Department. To some extent these
innovations arise out of earlier studies of the Post Office, such as the
1949 and 1955 Hoover Commission Reports,4 but to a significant degree they represent delayed responses to the pressures of increasing
size and complexity of operations. Recent events, such as the catastrophic tie-up in the Chicago Post Office, 5 demonstrate that these responses have been inadequate. Mail volume is increasing at a rate of
over three billion pieces annually; it is estimated that the volume in
fiscal year 1968 will be some 415 pieces per capita. 6 Postmaster General Lawrence O'Brien has claimed that the Department is in a "race
with catastrophe"; 7 that the Post Office will be incapable of dealing
with its future demand unless massive changes are instituted. The
major problems will be detailed below under three headings: Personnel and Organization, Finance, and Operations.

I. PROBLEMS OF THE POST OFFICE
A. Personnel and Organization
As of June 30, 1966, the Post Office had over 675,000 employees;
employment statistics indicate larger increases of the work force each
I. As of 1962, "the whole of the scholarly literature on the Post Office comprise[d]
just six doctoral dissertations ••••" M. BARATZ, THE ECONOMICS OF TilE PosrAL SERVICE
I (1962).
2. Present volume is eighty-three billion pieces of mail annually. Hearings on Post
Office Appropriations Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House].
The mail moves through 44,000 post offices, stations and branches. Id. at 402-03.
3. A British study suggests that the real cost of transporting mail has declined, but
no studies in the United States establish this hypothesis. Compare I SELECT CoMMI.TI'EE ON NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES, FIRST REPORT-THE Posr OFFICE 61 (1967) [hereinaner cited as SELECT COMMI.TI'EE REPORT].
4. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF TilE GOVERNMENT,
THE Posr OFFICE DEPARTMENT, and other reports (1949) [hereinafter cited as 1949
HOOVER COMMISSION]; COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF TilE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF TilE
GoVERNMENT, PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE, and other reports (1955) [hereinafter cited
as 1955 HOOVER COMMISSION].
5. Remsberg, The Day the Mails Stopped, SATURDAY REv., Dec. 17, 1966, at 21.
6. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 28. Approximately 80% of all mail and
75% of all first-class mail is business mail. Id. at 54-55. Moreover, mail is heavily
concentrated at certain times and places. It is estimated that a billion pieces of mail
are handled by New York City's General Post Office during the Christmas period. This
is more than the total annual mail of Belgium, and as much as that of France. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 6, 1967, at 41, col. 5.
7. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 4; Cordtz, It's Now or Never for the Post
Office, FORTUNE, March 1967, at 134.
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year. 8 It is a bottom-heavy labor force: clerks, mail handlers, carriers,
drivers, and maintenance personnel constituted 402,000 of the total,
and substitute employees in these positions9 comprised an additional
201,000. Pay grades among this group range from PFS-1 through
PFS-6, a salary range of $4,324 to $8,680.1° Fewer than 100,000 positions in the entire postal service are above the postal clerk and lettercarrier category. 11
At the lower levels, the problems of attracting and retaining
employees are significant, for rather obvious reasons. Pay rates are
uniform nationwide; thus, while Post Office positions are desirable
in areas of low living costs, it is difficult if not impossible to attract
prospects of similar quality to Post Office positions in major urban
centers, where costs of living and competing opportunities together
render postal salaries unattractive.12 Moreover, new employees begin
8. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL-FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT 38, 80
(1966).
9. Authorized by 39 U.S.C. § 3302 (1964).
10. 39 U.S.C. § 3542 (Supp. II 1965-1966) (pay scale). Under a postal rate and federal
salaries bill signed by the President in December 1967, postal field service salaries were
increased 6% retroactive to October 1, 1967, and will be increased another 5% on
July 1, 1968. H.R. 7977, § 3542, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See S. REP. No. 801, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1967). The cited figures are effective July 1, 1968. 85% of all
postal workers are in the bottom five grades. Cordtz, supra note 7, at 136.
11. S. REP. No. 801, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967).
12. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 24, 430-31. See, e.g., the statement of the
President of the National Association of Letter Carriers concerning low entrance salaries
in New York City. Id. at 728. The 1955 Hoover Commission noted that postal pay
classifications were too detailed and elaborate and that they did not respond to varying
regional pay rates. 1955 HOOVER COMMISSION, PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE 54-57. Although there is authority for the Civil Service Commission to establish higher minimum
wages, within limits, if area wages are so substantially above the pay rates of statutory
pay schedules as to handicap significantly the Government's recruitment or retention
of well-qualified individuals, this authority appears to have been sparsely used-if at _
all-in the postal service. 5 U.S.C. § 5303 (Supp. II 1965-1966). See, e.g., the testimony
of Congressman William Ford of Michigan:
I have spent some time looking at the wage policies of the American Telephone
&: Telegraph Co. They have a very sophisticated regional wage scale system that
they have worked out over a period of years.
Now, I have heard it said around the Hill since I came here a couple of years
ago that the reason we don't try to do this with Federal employees is because
the employee organizations have opposed it.
If they have opposed it vigorously, I don't know what proposal they might
have opposed, because in preparation for these hearings I have checked back,
and found that in the past 4 years the administration in none of its proposals
has suggested any such plan.
[F]rankly, I don't know of a single post office in my district that doesn't have
more positions authorized than it has people to fill them .•••
It seems unfortunate that we should be building toward a service that is
growing as fast or faster, in the demand that the public is making on it, than
anything in our entire economy•••. [Y]et we are not anticipating the tremendous
demands that will be made on it by doing something realistic about recruiting and
keeping the kind of people who can be trained for the more sophisticated
machinery that this committee is talking about making available.
Hearings on H.R. 8261 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Compensation
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-15, at

53-54 (1967).
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as substitutes, with no assurance of a full week's work and pay, and
often with undesirable night shifts.13
Once in the postal service, employees receive little training and
have remarkably few opportunities to progress to higher grades or
greater responsibilities. Four out of five postal employees remain in
the same grade throughout their careers, receiving periodic salary increases within that grade; they have little motivation to excel.14
Moreover, it has frequently been claimed, though not well documented, that the giving of promotions at even the lowest grades is
affected by political considerations.15
In technical positions, as well as at the managerial and executive
levels, these problems are at least as severe. Until quite recently, little
effort was made to hire college graduates for managerial positions.
Efforts to attract such people, as well as professional talent-engineers, attorneys, and the like-have been hampered by low salaries,
unattractive working conditions,16 and the suspicion that political
considerations affect advancement. 17 A pilot program was recently
initiated to develop a cadre of trained supervisors; this operates in
conjunction with a project that for the first time permits voluntary transfers of employees from one post office to another for experience and advancement.18 Since, however, postmasters are politRegional pay variation, however, is an issue of considerable union concern, and
many employee organizations do not favor such a policy. Cf. SELECT COMMITIEE REPORT
36, 38 (union objections to local pay differentials in Great Britain).
13. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 73, 338-41, 754. Turnover among such
substitutes is high.
14. See Cordtz, supra note 7, at 136-37.
15. See, e.g., the statement of the President of the National Postal Union in 1968
Appropriations Hearings-House 756; Cordtz, supra note 7, at 137; Greenfield, What's
the Matter With the Mails, REPORTER, Feb. 11, 1965, at 21, 24.
16. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 321, 701, 715, 722-23. Rigidity of the
civil service promotion scheme makes it difficult to retain professionals. Id. at 682.
17. Id. at 69-70. Note the following rather strained exchange:
Mr. Robison •••• Isn't one of your problems, Mr. Postmaster General, in attracting talent, young talent, from the college university campuses and so on that
political overstructure that tends to inhibit career advancement, at least at the
top levels of the Post Office?
Mr. O'Brien. I am not sure, Mr. Robison, that in general management, headquarters, regional, across this country that we have restrictions imposed upon us
along these lines. Perhaps there are occasions. I am trying to recall now but I
I can't-any specifics.
18. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 361. The Department has had a year of
favorable experience with a management intern program, and it plans for 1968 to
initiate a Postal Staff Institute. Id. at 341-42, 367-68. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL 143-44 (1966).
It may prove surprising to those unfamiliar with the Post Office that lateral trans•
fers have generally been forbidden from one post office to another. But see 39 U.S.C.
§ 3332 (1964) (permitting transfers to branches). Mr. O'Brien describes the voluntary
transfer arrangement as "unprecedented." 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 7. In
fairness to the Department, it should be noted that labor generally opposes such
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ical appointees, the advancing Post Office employee who is without
political influence faces a substantial impediment to his further
progress.19 While it is true that in all government departments
political considerations enter into promotions at the highest levels,
under present policies the top 25,000 jobs in the Post Office are
filled by presidential appointment; 20 and, from 1960 to 1967, nearly
two-thirds of the new postmaster appointments were drawn from
outside the ranks of postal employees.21 That some of these outside
appointees prove to be excellent postmasters is clear; it is equally
clear, however, that many do not, and even more obvious that the
appointment process produces a grave morale problem.22 Objections to the political appointment of postmasters have been voiced
since at least the 1949 Hoover Commission Report, which recommended generally that "the Post Office should be taken out of politics,'' and specifically that confirmation of postmasters by the Senate be abolished.23 A task force of the 1955 Hoover Commission
concluded that political selection of postmasters "is incompatible
with a businesslike management of the largest civilian business that
the Government operates," and recommended that postmasters be
named by the Postmaster General without Senate confirmation.24
This recommendation, however, was never adopted by the Commission itself; it remained for subsequent legislative proposals to
transfers, even on a voluntary basis; for example, they oppose the pilot project on
voluntary transfers. Id. at 68.
19. Postmasters of first-, second•, and third-class post offices are appointed by the
President, with Senate confirmation. 39 U.S.C. § 331l(a) (1964). The formal procedure
calls for written or oral examinations to be given by the Civil Service Commission, with
the top three eligibles certified to the Postmaster General, who in turn recommends
one for appointment by the President. But in fact, an "advisor," usually the local
Congressman of the party in power, transmits the choice of local party leaders to the
Postmaster General. Indeed, if the chosen man does not qualify on the examination,
a new examination may be scheduled. NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE, POUCY STATE•
MENT: ABANDONING PATRONAGE IN POSTAL APPOINTMENTS (1966). Patronage rights of
Senators and Congressmen are a matter of record not only as to appointment of post•
masters, but also as to appointments in regional offices of the Post Office. See Hearings
on Nomination of Lawrence F. O'Brien To Be Postmaster General of the United States
Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965).
20. As of June !JO, 1966, 24,720 postmaster positions were subject to presidential
appointment. 8,401 fourth-class postmaster positions are filled by appointment of the
Postmaster General under !!9 u.s.c. § !l!lll(b) (1964). ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POST·
MASI"ER GENERAL-FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT 44-45 (1966).
21. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 49.
22. Id. at 48-50, !!54-55. Note that the postmaster position can be filled temporarily
by the naming of an acting postmaster, !!9 U.S.C. § !!315 (1964), and that this process
has been used to allow an otherwise unqualified candidate to qualify himself for
office. Id. at 164-66; NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE, supra note 19.
2!!. 1949 HOOVER CoMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 9-10.
24. 1955 HOOVER COMMISSION, REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON PERSONNEL AND CIVIL .SERVICE 133-35.
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advance this approach. 25 Despite these proposals, renewed with increasing frequency, the original appointment process remains.
Incompetent employees pose yet another problem: adverse personnel actions are long and drawn-out. The average processing
time for an appeal is nearly two months, 26 during which time the
employee stays on the rolls-often as a genuine impediment to
local operations-despite the fact that the Board of Appeals and
Review sustains the adverse action in about eighty-five per cent of
its cases.27
A problem endemic to the entire Department is lack of individual authority: from the Postmaster General down, executives,
managers, supervisors, and workers are so hamstrung by statutory
and regulatory restrictions that they are left with too little discretion to perform their jobs well.28 Witness the following exchange
between Congressman Steed and Postmaster General O'Brien:
Mr. Steed. General, in some degree by matters beyond anybody's
control and in some degree by act of the Congress and by other
legal requirements, would this be a fair summary: that at the present
time, as the manager of the Post Office Department, you have no
control over your workload, you have no control over the rates of
revenue, you have no control over the pay rates of the employees
that you employ, you have very little control over the conditions
of the service of these employees, you have virtually no control, by
the nature of it, of your physical facilities, and you have only a
limited control, at best, over the transportation facilities that you
are compelled to use-all of which adds up to a staggering amount
of "no control" in terms of the duties you have to perform. . . .
Mr. O'Brien. Mr. Chairman, I would have to generally agree with
your premise certainly. I must say that is a staggering list of "no
control." I don't know it has ever been put that succinctly to me.
If it had been at an appropriate time, perhaps I wouldn't be sitting here.29

Postmasters, like the Postmaster General, also suffer from a lack of
authority; although, for example, additional purchasing authority
was delegated to the postal region in 1966, the procurement authority of local postmasters remains small.30 A task force of the 1949 Hoover Commission reported that lack of authority and the correspond25. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
26. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 357 (57 days).
27. ld. at 331.
28. See generally Greenfield, supra note 15.
29. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 27-28.
30. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL 117 (1966). Note, for example, the
case of a lost lock box key that ultimately was resolved in the office of the Postmaster
General. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 259.
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ing diminution of accountability have produced a philosophy of
postal management that is "sluggish, irresolute, and wasteful, rather
than imaginative, decisive, and cost conscious." Efforts at improvement have accordingly been uninspired, low-gear, and, by comparison with private industry, generally mediocre.31
B. Finance

The most often-voiced complaint as to finances is that despite
rate increases in all classes of mail, postal deficits increase annually. 32 Financial problems begin with the preparation of the budget,
estimates for which are assembled locally some fifteen months before
the beginning of the fiscal year, an average of some two years before
funds are actually spent. Enactment of the Post Office budget has
generally preceded the beginning of the fiscal year. Postal revenues
are paid directly into the Post Office Fund in the Treasury; Congress
annually appropriates this fund plus an additional amount to cover
the projected deficit, and the total is then usable directly to pay Post
Office expenses.33 Supplemental appropriations to cover unexpected
increases in volume or wages have usually been passed without difficulty; they are occasionally made necessary by budget cuts imposed
earlier in the regular budgetary process. Appropriations are presently in six categories; the largest of these, some eighty per cent of
the total appropriation, is that devoted to operations. Ten per
cent is spent on transportation, and the remainder for administration, research and development, building occupancy, and plant and
equipment.34 Transfer benveen appropriations not in excess of five
31. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE POST OFFICE 32-34. Note
the comparable conclusion of the British investigation with respect to detailed Parliamentary control. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT 194.
32. Figures for 1966, 1967 and 1968 are as follows:

Deficiency in
Rates &: Fees
1966 Actual
1967 Estimated
1968 Estimated•

$399 million
637 million
82 million-profit

Losses on
Public Services

Net Operating
Loss

$543 million
567 million
574 million

$ 942 million

1204 million
492 million

• Including an estimated $700 million revenues from rate increases. 1968 Appro-

priations Hearings-House 107.
It is contemplated that the costs of "public services" will be assumed directly by the
federal government. 39 U.S.C. § 2302(c)(3) (1964). These costs, listed in 39 U.S.C. § 2303
(1964), include such items as reduced rates for second-class mailings, free postage on
reading matter for the blind, reduced third-class rates for charitable organizations,
and certain other free mailing privileges.
33. 39 U.S.C. § 2202 (1964). See, e.g., Post Office Department Appropriation Act, 81
Stat. 115 (1967).
34. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 98. In 1968 a seventh appropriation was
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per cent is permitted when authorized by the appropriation act; 85
and expenditure in excess of the appropriation is prohibited by the
Anti-Deficiency law.36
This entire budgetary process, at least as applied to the Post
Office, has tended to misdirect efforts that might otherwise have
been spent on seeking cost effectiveness to assuring legality and
securing appropriate approvals for the expenditure of appropriated
funds. The process is unresponsive to genuine Post Office needs,
and it is occasionally subject to political influences wholly unconcerned with postal operations.37 It was recognized nearly twenty
years ago that despite the liberalizing influences of freely available
supplemental appropriations and the ability to spend postal receipts, the postal budget merely created the appearance of flexibility, while the real effect was to produce rigidity of control within
the department rather than the flexibility of financial operations
necessary to a rapidly changing, essentially commercial activity.38
Yet the Post Office has only recently initiated financial controls
based to some degree on performance. The new Planning-Programming-Budgeting System89 is not yet used, however, in preparing
budget presentations to Congress. Congress therefore has little meaningful data for evaluating the financial effectiveness of the Department.
A second area of concern, operational as well as financial, is
approval of capital expenditures, including not only acquisitions
of post office buildings but purchases of machinery and equipment
added for postal public buildings, to be constructed by the Post Office Department for
the first time pursuant to a delegation of authority from the General Services Admin•
istration. Id. at 518-20. In an earlier period, Post Office appropriations were under fifty•
eight separate headings. This came under sharp attack. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE
Posr OFFICE DEPARTMENT 11.
35. 39 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. II 1965-1966). This transfer authority was excluded
from the 1968 Appropriation Act. Post Office Department Appropriation Act, 81 Stat.
115 (1967).
36. 31 u.s.c. § 665 (1964).
37. For example, the House attempt, in the context of cost-cutting associated with
the proposed 1968 tax increase, to cut postal spending to the point where the Department might have been forced to adopt drastic reductions in services. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 1967, at 2, col. 3. For an example of rate lobbying that backfired, however, see Wall Street Journal, Dec. 6, 1967, at 6, col. 2. See generally Greenfield, supra
note 15, at 22-23.
38. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE Posr OFFICE Ill.
39. This is a system of long-term program planning that has been adapted from
one in use by the Department of Defense. See, e.g., Hearings on Postal Modernization
Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities and Modernization of the House Comm. on
Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 19-20 (1967).
Budget estimates to the Bureau of the Budget were presented on a program basis as
well as the traditional appropriation basis in 1967. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL 142-44 (1967).
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as well. A major Post Office problem, the construction of multipurpose buildings to house post offices in accordance with General
Service Administration (GSA) plans, has recently been solved in
large measure through a delegation of construction authority from
the GSA to the Post Office Department.40 However, many problems
still remain: so heavily do the political patronage process and budgetary delays enter into building construction that many years
elapse after submission of a request before a new post office is
erected. And, despite the existence of sophisticated . and effective
mechanized devices for sorting and moving mail-such as the multiposition letter sorting machine 41-many major postal centers, including New York and Baltimore, have done without these machines
for years and even now do not have them. While it is true that
some recently publicized devices, such as the experimental optical
scanner in operation in Detroit,42 may yet be unproven and not
available for general use, many other devices as effective and troublefree as conveyor belts have not yet been generally infused into the
system. One may well conclude that querulous claims of the operationally unproved reliability and safety of new machines should
be treated with skepticism,43 and that delays in the development
and introduction of new machinery are more traceable to fiscal
limitations than to questions concerning the effectiveness of the
machinery. Postmaster General O'Brien, in rate increase hearings, noted the wide disparity between capital expenditures of the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, which devotes more
than one-third of its annual revenue to capital expenditures, and
the Post Office, which allocates only two per cent of its budget
thereto. 44 A portion of this difference may be attributable to differences in the operations of the two enterprises, but the point
should not be obscured that private industry has shown far greater
readiness to make substantial capital investments where increased
business or more effective operations are at stake.
40. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 8, 519-20 (text of delegation).
41. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PoSTJIIASTER GENERAL 47 (1966).
42. Id. at 68-70. The latest listing of postal modernization by city and type of equipment appears in Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal
Facilities and Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 42-43 (1967).
43. See, e.g., SELEcr COJIIMITTEE REPORT 45.
44. Hearings on the Postal Revenue Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Postal
Rates of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
90-14, at 16, 27 (1967). The first trace of postal modernization was not evident until
1955. Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities and
Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess,, ser. 90-17, pt. I, at 28-30 (1967).
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Ratemaking is the third financial headache. The Post Office
cannot regulate the demand for its services, and the Postmaster
General has authority to set rates on only special services, international mail, and parcel post, the latter only with Interstate Commerce Commission consent and on a nondeficit basis. Rates on first-,
second-, and third-class mail are determined by Congress, theoretically in accordance with the general mandates of the Postal Policy
Act.45 The Department's Cost Ascertainment System shows that in
fiscal year 1967, first-class mail produced a revenue surplus of $116
million; all other mail produced deficits-second-class, $416 million; third-class, $401 million; and fourth-class, $98 million.46
While it is contemplated that some services, such as mailings
of nonprofit organizations, will not cover their full costs, these
deficits have been greater than the so-called "public services costs."47
Cost ascertainment, however, is at best an estimate; since most
postal costs are common costs shared in some degree by all classes
of mail, much depends on the postulates of the costing system. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the Cost Ascertainment System has been
called into question.48 A particular point of contention has been
the extent to which third-class mail (often called "junk mail") pays
its way. 49 It has been suggested that third-class mail not only fails
to pay its totally allocated average costs, but even fails to cover its
marginal costs. 50 Perhaps the introduction of computer work measurement51 will allow more precise measurement of costs on each
of several costing postulates, but the setting of postal rates still remains a matter for Congress, not the Department, to evaluate. Although many will argue that postal rates are matters of essential
public policy properly entrusted only to Congress, it is not impossible to conceive of a rate schedule set by the Postmaster General,
subject to approval by Congress, much in the manner of a public
utility rate approved by a regulatory commission.52 This rate sched45. 39 u.s.c. §§ 2301-04 (1964).
46. Hearings on the Postal Revenue Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Postal
Rates of the House Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 90-14, at 29 (1967).
47. See note 32 supra.
48. The Cost Ascertainment System is subject to the major criticism that it reflects
fully allocated costs without regard to differences in the type of service rendered for
each class of mail. See M. BARATZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE POSTAL SERVICE 35-39 (1962).
49. See text accompanying note 229 infra.
50. BARATZ, supra note 48, at 42-43.
51. See ANNUAL RFPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL 53-55 (1966).
52. Both Congress and the Department have considered such an approach. 1968
Appropriations Hearings-House 52-53. The British view is that rates should be set by
the Post Office if it is to operate on a sound commercial basis. SELEcr Cm,rnITTEE REPORT 62-63.
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ule could, of course, make provision for subsidized rates where appropriate. 53 As it presently stands, however, the rate-making process
is another area of "no control" for the Department.
C. Operations
To the using public, the operational problems are obvious and
easily stated: delays, lost mail, insufficient pickup and delivery service. As might be expected, expansion of the system without compensating modernization has exacerbated these problems. What remains amazing is the small percentage of complaints about postal
service generally, possibly explained in part by the predisposition of
users simply not to complain.54
Few would argue that operations cannot be improved. It is important to recognize, however, the existence of certain limitations
endemic to the job. Post Office operations are labor-intensive and
will probably remain so notwithstanding improved technology. Of
the three major operations-pickup, sorting, and delivery-only the
second shows immediate promise of substantial manpower savings
through mechanization. 55 To be sure, some devices have cut manpower demands in both pickup (for example, mail chutes) and
delivery (for example, Vertical Improved Mailing), 56 but increases
in mail volume more than offset the manpower saved by mechanization. Thus, postal costs will rise as labor costs increase with
the cost of living; it has been suggested, however, that the financial
savings from those machines that are introduced can be expected
to be rather high. 57
A major issue in operations, then, is the extent to which research will be pursued and the degree to which products of that
research will be introduced into the system. Here, as we have already noted, the problem is essentially financial: expenditures for
research have been inadequate, and the introduction of even proven
devices has been slow. The recent creation of a new position, Assistant Postmaster General for Research and Engineering, and the
establishment of a Research and Engineering Advisory Council58
reflect a change in attitude, but it remains to be seen whether Con53. "Public services costs" are recognized by 39 U.S.C. § 2303 (1964). These costs are
listed separately as part of the net operating loss for the year. See note 32 supra.
5·1. Cordtz, supra note 7, at 136. But see 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House
19-20.
55. SELECT COMIIITITEE REPORT 43-44; Cordtz, supra note 7, at 195-96.
56. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTl\rASTER GENERAL 41-44 (1966).
57. See SELECT COMIIITITEE REPORT 44, 51-52.
58. 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 8.
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gress can appropriate-and the Post Office can spend-at a rate
necessary to assure effective modernization. The job is a big one:
nearly all of the seventy-five largest post offices, handling half of
the nation's mail, were built near railroad stations at a time when
10,000 trains daily hauled the mail. Today, with only 700 trains in
mail service, many of these buildings are badly located for transporting mail by truck or air. Moreover, many of them cannot be
modified to accept heavy and bulky mechanized equipment.159 The
Postmaster General has estimated that an optimum modernization
plan would cost $5 billion within the coming five years. 60
Other operational problems derive from the excessive control
exercised by Congress. In 1949, over 900 pages of laws and regulations circumscribed Post Office operations, tending to favor "operation of the Postal Service as an expensive arm of the Government,
rather than as the revolving fund service which it actually is.'' 61
Detailed control over minor matters deprived the Post Office of
the flexibility essential to meet changing commercial conditions. 62
Matters have changed little since then, as a few illustrations will
show. Although substantial savings can often be effected by shipping some mail through freight forwarders or common carr1ers
by truck, the Post Office has difficulty in using these means where
rail service is available, even when it is more expensive. 63 In a
related area, though it has been established that Post Offices must
have access to highways and air terminals, more often than not
they are still erected in town squares to satisfy local political demands.
These are the problems in brief, and while it is clear that only
recently have they been brought widely to the public's attention,
it is also true that Congress and the Department have addressed
59. Cordtz, It's Now or Never for the Post Office, FORTUNE, March 1967, at 136;
O'Brien, The Other Side of the Postal Story, U.S. NEWS &: WoRLD REPORT, Dec. 18,
1967, at 54; Remsberg, The Day the Mails Stopped, SATURDAY REV., Dec. 17, 1966, at 22.
60. Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities and
Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 34-35 (1967).
61. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 3, 14-15.
62. Id. This detailed control, for essentially political motives unrelated to the Department's operations, dates from the Department's origins. See generally W. RICH,
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE TO THE YEAR 1829 127-36 (1924); D.
ROPER, THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE 309-1!! (1917).
63. Formal advertisement of contracts for transportation of mail is required by 41
U.S.C. § 5 (1964). Contracts with railroads, however, may be made without formal
advertising pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 6215 (1964). The complexities and delays of formal
advertising interfere with on-the-spot exercise of discretion in the choice of transporta•
tion modes as loads vary. See 39 C.F.R. § 521.3 (1967). Indeed, 39 U.S.C. § 6402a (1964)
was passed to allow negotiated contracts with bus-lines, because advertising proved impossible. S. REP. No. 756, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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them before. The history of congressional reform efforts does not
afford great hope for the future.
II.

THE FUTILITY OF PRIOR REFORM EFFORTS

The most recent comprehensive effort to reform the Post Office
followed the 1949 Hoover Commission findings on the Department.
An immediate result of the entire Hoover Commission Report was
the passage of the Reorganization Act of 1949,64 the purpose of
which was to facilitate reorganization of the executive agencies
through submission of reorganization plans by the President. 65 The
Act authorizes the President to deliver reorganization plans to both
houses of Congress, and provides that any such plan shall ~ake effect
and be printed in the Statutes at Large if neither house, within sixty
days, passes a resolution disfavoring the plan. 66 One of the earliest
plans thus delivered was Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1949,67 which
addressed a few of the most significant problems unearthed by the
Hoover Commission Report on the Post Office. It centralized authority over the Department in the Postmaster General for the first
time; previously the Assistant Postmasters General had specifically
delegated areas of authority over which the Postmaster General had
no control. In addition, the Plan authorized the Postmaster General
to delegate his authority. 68 It established a Deputy Postmaster General, three Assistant Postmasters General, and a Postal Advisory
Board, as recommended by the Hoover Commission. 69 Finally, the
Plan abolished the separate Bureau of Accounts of the Post Office
Department and the Office of the Purchasing Agent for the Post Office Department.70 All this was done, as the accompanying message
from President Truman noted, as "an important first step in strengthening the organization of the Post Office Department."
It was not much more than a first step, and a tentative step
at that. So, although the Hoover Commission had recommended
that the President appoint an experienced executive, preferably
from within the Postal Service, to serve without term as a Director
of Posts under the Postmaster General,11 the Plan specified neither
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
No. 3.

5 U.S.C. §§ 901-13 (Supp. II 1965-1966).
See H.R. REP. No. 23, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. I (1949).
5 U.S.C. §§ 903, 906 (Supp. II 1965-1966).
63 Stat. 1066 (1949); 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (Note) (1964).
Section I.
Sections 2-4.
Section 5.
The title was changed to Deputy Postmaster General in Reorganization Plan
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term nor qualifications. The fault lay to some extent with the
Reorganization Act, which requires that any appointment not under
the classified civil service be made by the President, with Senate
confirmation. Moreover, the term of office can be fixed at no greater
period than four years. Indeed, as noted earlier, the Hoover Commission made no suggestion to eliminate this appointment process
as to the Postmaster General or the proposed Director of Posts.72
However, in addition to their recommendation on the Director of
Posts they did recommend that the Postmaster General should not
be a political party official. Given the political nature of the appointment process, it may be questioned whether such limitations could
ever have been effectively enforced, and the Plan made no such
attempt. Only two bills73 were ever introduced that included provisions to prohibit appointment of a party official as Postmaster
General. The Senate Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service held hearings on one of these bills, a general reorganization
proposal, 74 but made no mention of this prohibition. The bill was
indefinitely postponed because the Committee felt that Reorganization Plan No. 3 and other bills under consideration-none of
which addressed the issue of appointment of the Postmaster General-were adequate. A year later, this same recommendation of
the Hoover Commission was again considered. Testimony before
the House Committee at that time noted that the incumbent Postmaster General was not a party official, 75 and no further action was
taken on this recommendation. All Postmasters General since then
have been selected from outside the Post Office on the basis of political considerations.76
Among the most significant of the Hoover Commission recom72. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 8 (Recommendations
I, 2).
73. S. 2062, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); and a companion House Bill, H.R. 5177,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
74. S. 2062, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); Hearings on Bills To Implement Recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st 8:
2d Sess. (1949 8: 1950).
75. Hearings on Recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government Before the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1951).
76. Arthur E. Summerfield (1953-1961) was the Chairman of the Republican National
Committee immediately preceding his appointment. J. Edward Day (1961-1963) at the
time of his appointment was Chairman of the Democratic Association of Los Angeles
County. John A. Gronouski (1963-1965) was the Commissioner of Taxation for Wisconsin; while he was Postmaster General he also acted as political liaison to various
groups. Lawrence F. O'Brien (1965 to date), an original member of the Kennedy "Irish
Mafia,'' acted as White House liaison with Congress before his appointment, and
continues to do so.

February 1968]

The U.S. Post Office, Incorporated

629

mendations was that Senate confirmation of postmasters be abolished.77 It is doubtful whether the Reorganization Act of 1949 permitted inclusion of such a provision in a Reorganization Plan,78
and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1949 did not so provide. However, President Truman strongly supported nonpolitical selection
of postmasters in a special message to Congress:
It is an axiom of sound administration that authority should be
commensurate with responsibility. No authority of management is
more important than that of selecting the personnel who are to
operate the business. I£ the Postmaster General is to be held responsible for the efficient conduct of the postal service, he should
be given full authority to appoint postmasters and other postal employees subject only to the provisions of the Civil Service and Classification Acts. Legislation should be enacted which will give such
authority to the Postmaster General. 79

In this recommendation, stronger than that of the Hoover Commission Report, the President was joined by the Postmaster General, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Civil Service Commission. 80
Beginning with the Eighty-first Congress, there have been introduced to date some ninety bills to remove political influences, to
a greater or lesser extent, in the naming of postmasters. A favorable subcommittee recommendation on one such bill, one of the
six addressing the issue in the Eighty-first Congress in response to
the Hoover Commission Report, 81 was rejected by the full committee on grounds that the Senators were better informed as to the
qualifications of prospective postmasters in their respective states
than the Postmaster General.82
The bills fall into two general categories, reflecting varying views
on the methods of insulating the choice of postmasters from the political process. The first group would amend section 3311(a) of title
77. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE Posr OFFICE DEPARTMENT IO (Recommendation 5).
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 904(2) (Supp. II 1965-1966).
79. H.R. Doc. No. 239, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).
80. Hearings on Bills To Implement Recommendations of the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Before the Senate Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess., 131 (1949-1950).
81. S. 2062, S. 2213, H.R. 5177, H.R. 5344, H.R. 5538, H.R. 5643, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949).
82. Hearings on Bills To Implement Recommendations of the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Before the Senate Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 131-34 (1949-1950) (S. 2213).
The number of bills introduced shows an interesting pattern: in the Eighty-second
through Eighty-eighth Congresses, between one and four bills were introduced in each
Congress. In the Eighty-ninth Congress, thirteen bills were introduced; and in the
Ninetieth, forty-two bills have been introduced to date.
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39 of the United States Code to provide that the Postmaster General,
rather than the President, shall appoint postmasters at first-, second-,
and third-class post offices, and to provide for exclusion of political
advice and recommendations.83 A second class of bills would continue the naming of postmasters by the President with Senate confirmation but would add a new requirement: that the selection be
made first from within the Postal Field Service on the basis of noncompetitive examinations; and if no candidate qualifies thereby, by
competitive examinations. The political influence question would
be dealt with by a section detailing prohibitions against receiving
or giving political advice in connection with any position in the
Postal Field Service, and making violation thereof the cause for
dismissal and fine. 84 Two bills passed by the Senate in the Ninetieth Congress now await House action. In different forms both attempt to combine the favorable features of earlier bills. One of
these is part of the proposed Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967.85
The history of reform in other spheres is not promising. Despite
the Hoover Commission's recommendation to simplify some 900
pages of statutes and regulations applicable to the Post Office, title
39 of the United States Code today comprises 132 pages, and title
39 of the Code of Federal Regulations adds another 694 pages. Recognition by at least some members of Congress of this administrative
nightmare has yet to produce a comprehensive effort to reform and
simplify the operational framework of the Department.
Some changes have been made in the last twenty years. The third
recommendation of the Hoover Commission-that the Department
be decentralized into fifteen regions under regional directors-was
partially implemented in 1955 and fully put into effect by 1956 by
83. E.g., H.R. 3312, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 12862, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
84. E.g., H.R. 5284, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
85. S. 355, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) was passed by the Senate on March 7, 1967,
and referred to the House Rules Committee. Section 441 thereof would amend 39
U.S.C. § 3311 (1964) to provide for the naming of postmasters by the Postmaster General in accordance with civil service laws and rules by competitive examinations and
promotions within the postal service. Recommendations or statements by members of
Congress or party officials would be prohibited. Sections 442 and 443 of the bill extend
essentially the same provisions to the naming of interim postmasters and the appointment of rural carriers.
The second bill, S. 2154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), was passed by the Senate on
November 30, 1967. It would amend 39 U.S.C. § 3311 (1964) to read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Postmaster General shall appoint
postmasters in accordance with the Civil Service Act and rules except that in each
case he shall appoint the person who is certified to him by the Civil Service Commission as the eligible applicant who has the highest earned rating among the
applicants examined.
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regulation.86 Ironically, this was the one Hoover Report recommendation most strongly opposed by both the President and the
Postmaster General, on grounds that the Postmaster General could
not genuinely decentralize what authority he had; that he could not,
for example, allow regions to set local wage scales, as a decentralized
industry might. 87 The subsequent history of the postal regions suggests that the President and Postmaster General may have been correct: regions now have inadequate authority or information to
pass on many issues put to them, and they often function either as
rubber stamps for the postmasters or as intermediaries between the
postmasters and the office of the Postmaster General. 88
The picture is not entirely bleak. A key recommendation of the
Hoover Report, that the business-type controls of the Government
Corporation Control Act of 194589 be made applicable to the Post
Office, was at least partially effected, with favorable results. The
recommendation was not literally followed, but an important first
step in simplifying fiscal operations was embodied in the Post Office
Appropriation Act of 1951: 90 reduction of the number of individual
appropriations from fifty-eight to four. 91 The second step was passage of the Post Office Department Financial Control Act of 1950.92
This Act centralized accounting and reporting functions previously
performed by the General Accounting Office in the Post Office Department; provided a revolving fund for the Post Office composed
of its revenues plus additional appropriations necessary to cover predicted deficits; provided for separate reporting of services performed
free or at special rates; authorized audit of the Department by the
Comptroller General; and implemented other administrative simplifications. The Act was designed generally to afford flexibility in
accounting and auditing procedures and to allow better use of ac86. See S. REP. No. 167, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1957); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &: ADMN.
NEWS, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3274 (1955). The postal regions are established by 39 C.F.R.
§ 811.3 (1967).
87. Hearings on Bills To Implement Recommendations of the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Before the Senate Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 81st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 19-21. But see W. DOHERTY,
MAILMAN, U.S.A. 203 (1960), in which a former president of the National Association
of Letter Carriers suggests that the Postmaster General's objection to this recommendation was provoked by his personal inability to delegate responsibility.
88. See 1968 Appropriations Hearings-House 733-34; DOHERTY, supra note 87, at
262.
89. 31 u.s.c. §§ 841-69 (1964).
90. Post Office Department Appropriation Act of 1951, 64 Stat. 640 (1950).
91. There are now seven appropriation headings. See note 34 supra.
92. 39 u.s.c. §§ 2202, 2206-08, 2211 (1964).
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counting techniques as tools of management; 93 without question
administration was significantly simplified. But today, more than
fifteen years since passage of these simplifications, the Department
has taken only the first steps toward using business-type financial
controls.94 The annual appropriation process and the associated accounting for legality of obligations, as opposed to efficiency of operations, has much to do with this lack of progress.
Other major problems of the Post Office remain untouched.
Ratemaking is still a highly charged political process largely unrelated to Post Office needs or operations. The same must be said of
wages, and of the classes and details of service. Capital financing and
research and development have seen improvements, as have training
programs, but as to these far more remains to be done than has been
done to date. And in periods of fiscal austerity, financial investments
in progress may be small.
The verdict is inescapable. Congress has not done the job, partly
because it has had to satisfy conflicting political desires, but perhaps
primarily because it cannot handle the details of a complex department's operations, and it has consistently failed to give the necessary
authority and incentive to those who can and should improve the
Department: those within the Department itself. Recent history
suggests that some measure of congressional disengagement may
afford the only hope for true reform. Can some other form of organization-for example, the public corporation-reasonably be expected to do the job better? If so, what must be done to establish
the necessary organizational framework?

III.

THE OPERATIONS OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

Of the wide variety of organizations that can be used to carry on
the government's public enterprises, the most tightly tied to the
government is the department or ministry, the category into which
the United States Post Office Department presently fits. Public
authorities, often of a local or regional nature, are widely used for
the operation of roads, bridges, tunnels, and ports, as well as conservation and utility projects.95 Alternatively, services of an inherently monopolistic nature or those affected with a public interest
may be provided by private corporations subject to control by a
regulatory commission, of which examples on a national level are the
93. See H.R. REP. No. 2339, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1950).
94. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
95. See .ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
SPECIAL DISTRicrs IN AMEru:CAN GOVERNMENT 12-25 (1964).
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Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and
Federal Communications Commission. In addition to these familiar
forms of public enterprise, there are as well the private stock corporation used for public enterprises,96 the mixed enterprise, and the
public corporation.
Discussion herein will be directed to possible use of the public
corporation for the Post Office, although it is clear that arguments
might be advanced in favor of using another form of organization.
Telephone service, though provided by a government department or
ministry in virtually all other nations of the world, 97 is in the United
States provided by a private corporation regulated by federal and
state regulatory commissions. While this approach can be adapted to
the Post Office,98 the Post Office has existed so long under tight government control that any attempt to move it into the hands of private
stockholders, however regulated, might encounter insurmountable
political resistance. Moreover, the problems of organization and
transition to public corporation status would be considerably less
complex than those attendant upon establishment and capitalization
of a private corporation together with the necessary regulatory commission.99 Although the private corporation idea is not considered in
detail herein, many of the critical attributes of any workable public
corporation arrangement must be similar if not identical to those
of a regulated private corporation. A mixed enterprise might introduce capital contributions by private investors as well as the government, with some sharing of control between the government and the
private shareholders. While reduction of the government's investment in the Post Office may be desirable, there do not appear to be
compelling reasons for shifting control to the private investors, and
as the TVA example shows,100 bond financing in a wholly public
corporation can reduce the government's investment without affecting control. Finally, the distinction between the public corporation
96. See w. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBUC OWNERSHIP 27-28 (1960)
(citing use of this device in India at the present time, and in England briefly during
nationalization of the steel industry).
97. ROBSON, supra note 96, at 24.
98. See, e.g., Milton Friedman's oversimplified suggestion to allow competition in
the delivery of mails by revocation of 39 U.S.C. § 901 (1964). NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1967,
at 87.
99. Creation of a public corporation subject to internal governmental control often
obviates the need for a regulatory commission. See Lilienthal &: Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal Government, 54 HARV. L. REv. 545, 575
(1941). But cf. the mixed internal and regulatory control structure of the Communications Satellite Corporation discussed in Schwartz, Comsat, the Carriers, and the Earth
Stations: Some Problems With "Melding Variegated Interests," 76 YALE L.J. 441 (1967).
100. See text accompanying note 151 infra.
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and the public authority may be largely a matter of definition, the
latter often being considered a form of public corporation. Both
have been used to carry out local or regional activities with a degree
of insulation from the usual political process and an element of
financial independence; and, in both, politics still plays a role.101
Reorganization of the Post Office would look toward an organization
of this type, but of nationwide scope. At the root of our inquiry will
be the powers and control structure of such an enterprise, whatever
it be called.
Among the best developed examples of public corporations are
the nationalized industries of Great Britain and several public corporations in the United States. In the first group are the National Coal
Board, the British Electric Authority, the Gas Council, the British
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and the British European
Airways (BEA). The British Post Office, though not in law a nationalized industry, is conducted as such.102 In the second group are the
World War I emergency corporations,1°3 various banking corporations,104 and the TVA. More numerous are corporations or public
authorities organized by state governments or by interstate agreements, such as the Port of New York Authority.105 The nationalized
industries, which are essentially commercial enterprises involved in
selling a product or service to consumers, and TVA, part of whose
operations are of this type, bear marked similarities to the operations
of the Post Office; details of their relations with the government offer
clues to the utility of the corporate form as it might be applied to
the delivery of mail. For aside from its long history as a government
department affected with a public interest, the Post Office is essentially a business enterprise rendering a commercial service to the
public for a fee. And, at least arguably, the public interest in it is
not substantially different from that in the telephone system, which
is a regulated private corporation. British experience with their
IOI. See R. WooD, 1400 GOVERNMENTS 131-34 (1964). Illustrative of the detailed
arguments on definitions is Gerwig, Public Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW
& CoNTEMP, PROB, 591, 592-94 (1961).
102. See SELEcr COMMITI'EE REPORT 7.
103. For example, the Emergency Fleet Corporation. See Abel, The Public Corporation in the United States, m THE PUBUC CORPORATION 338, 341 (W. Friedmann
ed. 1954).
104. For example, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. See Abel, supra note
103, at 343; Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 99, at 548-49.
105. More than 18,000 such corporations or "special districts" were m existence
m 1964. Numbers will vary based on definitions. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
26-33 (1964).
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nationalized industries led, in fact, to the proposal that their Post
Office be reorganized as a public corporation.106
It is important to note that the nationalized industries are examples of private corporations or local public authorities reorganized
as national public enterprises, a movement toward greater government control. By contrast, any suggestion that the Post Office-a
government department-be reorganized as a public corporation asks
for a movement toward greater autonomy. TVA involved organization of governmental activities as a public corporation, but TVA was
initiated as a government corporation, and its activities, too, are
in large part commercial in the recognized sense. Thus, reorganization of the Post Office as a public corporation would represent an
unprecedented divestiture of control by the Congress and the Executive in one of the government's largest enterprises.
Use of public corporations in both Great Britain and the United
States was sparked by the need for greater managerial independence
and control over details of operations than would be afforded by a
government department:
The underlying reason for the creation of the modem type of public
corporation is the need for a high degree of freedom, boldness and
enterprise in the management of undertakings of an industrial or
commercial character and the desire to escape from the caution and
circumspection which is considered typical of government departments.101
Earl Attlee, a former Postmaster-General, stated the effect of detailed
government control as follows:
[It] tends to timidity and centralization and has militated against
the adoption of a public relations technique in the service.... The
Minister and his principal officials, who ought to be concerned with
major problems, are constantly diverted to deal with matters which
owe their importance only to the status of those who bring them
forward. 108
Full realization of the potential benefits of public corporations
turns on the presence of several essential characteristics. The first
106. See REORGANISATION OF THE Posr OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233 (1967).
107. ROBSON, supra note 96, at 47. The footnote to this sentence notes:
The Post Office has been criticized by members of all political parties as an
example of how the constitution of an ordinary government department is illdesigned to secure business efficiency in the services which it administers. Criticism culminated in a Memorial signed by some 320 M.Ps. and addressed to the
Prime Minister in December, 1931. See the Report of the Committee of Inquiry
on the Post Office, HMSO, CMND. 4149/1932.
108. Attlee, Post Office Reform, NEW STATESMAN &: NATION, Nov. 7, 1931 (cited in
ROBSON, supra note 96, at 59).
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is freedom from governmental inquiry into the details of management, as opposed to over-all policy. The second is disinterestedness,
in the sense that the corporation's board of directors not be enjoined to make a profit for the benefit of shareholders, but rather to
run the corporation in the public interest, on an essentially selfsustaining basis. In addition, those corporations should not be a
part of the civil service; and while they might be subject to occasional admonitions to keep wage scales in line with those paid
government employees, they should not be subject to detailed regulations on conditions of service, hiring, dismissal, and the like.
Neither should finances of public corporations be subject to all the
controls of the appropriation process, despite government control
over some aspects of financial operations. Finally, the boards of these
corporations should have fixed terms-they should not change with
each administration, nor have the life tenure of career civil servants.109
The public corporation is based on the theory that a full measure
of accountability can be imposed on a public authority without
requiring it to be subject to ministerial control in respect of its
managerial decisions and multitudinous routine activities, or liable
to comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny of its day-to-day working.
The theory assumes that policy, in major matters at least, can be
distinguished from management or administration; and that a successful combination of political control and managerial freedom can
be achieved by reserving certain powers of decision in matters of
major importance to Ministers answerable to Parliament and leaving
everything else to the discretion of the public corporation acting
within its legal competence. The Government are further endowed
with residual powers of direction and appointment which mark their
unquestionable authority.110
Have these broad principles been effected in the British nationalized industries and their American counterparts? Did the corporations achieve the purposes for which they were created?
A. The British Nationalized Industries
In view of the similarity of organization and control among the
British nationalized industries, they may usefully be discussed collectively. Major areas of control are relationships between the
minister and the corporation board, and between Parliament and
both the minister and the board.
109. See Lilienthal &: Marquis, supra note 99, at 560-67;
at 64-69.
110. Id. at 74, 76.

ROBSON,

supra note 96,
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The appropriate minister names the members of the corporation's board. He may give the corporation "directions of a general
character as to the exercise and performance by the corporation of
their functions in relation to matters appearing to the Minister to
affect the national interest"; 111 and the corporation is bound to give
effect to these directions. To this broad grant are appended certain
stated powers; thus, the minister has express statutory power,
with Treasury approval, to give detailed directions concerning
the establishment, management and application of a reserve fund,
provided only that any application of the fund must be for purposes
of the corporation. Reorganization or development programs involving substantial commitments of capital must be framed along
lines approved by the minister. In addition, stated powers may be
granted on major matters affecting certain corporations; for example,
the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation has power to require
all aircraft used by BOAC and BEA to be registered in some part
of Great Britain. Other powers are conferred on the Treasury: it
must approve salaries of chairmen, deputy chairmen, and members of
the boards. It also has general approval over establishment and use
of reserve funds, and over the form of financial statements in the
annual accounting. And, most important, borrowing by the corporations is from the ministry by consent of both the minister and
the Treasury.112
This statutory framework-particularly the naming of the board
and approval of reorganizations-clearly affords the government
very substantial control over the operations of the corporations.113
But it does not, at least on its face, substantially limit the corporations in such detailed business questions as choice of equipment, type
of service, and rates to be charged therefor. And the financial objective, as outlined in a 1961 White Paper, does not seriously limit the
freedom of the corporations: they are required to break even (including a return on investment and charges for depreciation and contingencies) over a five-year period. 114 But in practice, control over the
corporations has been substantially expanded. The statutory formula
III. Id. at 139. See, e.g., Gas Act, 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 67, § 7(1); Electricity
Act, 1957, 5 &: 6 Eliz. 2, c. 48, § 8(1).
II2. E.g., Electricity Act, 1963, c. 59, § 2(1). On long-term capital planning, there
is now annual discussion between the corporation and the government. THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC OBUGATIONS OF THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES, CMND. No. 1337, at 8-9
(1961).
II3. See Albu, Ministerial and Parlimentary Control, in THE LEssoNs OF PUBuc
ENTERPRISE 93-94 (M. Shanks ed. 1963).
II4. THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC OBUGATIONS OF THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES,
CMND. No. 1337, at 7, 8 (1961). The industries have varied in their ability to break

even. Id. at 11.
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concerning ministerial intervention is open to varying interpretation, and any attempt at narrow interpretation by the board of a
corporation might well be met with overwhelming counterpressure
-perhaps in the form of proposed legislation-by the appropriate
minister. The ministerial power to appoint and reappoint board
members is also not an inconsiderable weapon. Ministers have
tended by the use of such influence to exercise substantially more
control over the corporations than the statutory language, or their
infrequent public announcements, would indicate.ms Indeed, at
least a few ministers have suggested that they have a duty to exercise
such influence, and in some industries pricing and wages have been
subject to continual ministerial intervention, with clearly undesirable results.116 This practice raises questions on the extent of government control over operations and the form in which any such control
should be exercised.
We have noted that the advantages to be obtained from the
public corporation, as opposed to a government department, derive
from its autonomy in certain key areas such as prices, employment,
and details of service. There can be little question that if all of
these areas are subject to detailed governmental control the corporation will remain only a concept while the organization continues to
be run entirely as a government department.117 On the other hand,
an enterprise vested with a key national interest may in the course of
making business-type decisions impair major national objectives.
While many of these decisions affecting the national interest can
be dealt with by statute (as, for example, the British statutory requirement of approval of major capital expenditure by the Treasury),
an equal number of such problems-often arising unforeseen-must
be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.118 As to these, the necessity of a
concordance of business interest and public interest is inescapable:
When full allowance has been made for the possibility that Ministers
may not always act from politically disinterested motives, there is
115. Albu, supra note 113, at 91, 93-99. This influence has been used most frequently in the area of price. Jenkins, Foreword, in THE LEssoNs OF Punuc ENTERPRISE
8-9 (M. Shanks ed. 1963).
116. ROBSON, supra note 98, at 142-44, 150-56 (transport and coal): Shanks, Prices
and Profits, in THE LEssoNs OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 56-58, 62 (M. Shanks ed. 196!1);
Shanks, The Aims and the Problems, in THE LEssoNs OF Punuc ENTERPRISE 17, 30-31
(M. Shanks ed. 1963).
117. Even in that situation it is critical who in the government actually controls
the enterprise. A major problem discussed earlier is that Congress-and not the Post•
master General-runs much of the Post Office. Text accompanying note 28 supra.
118. See Note, The Role of the Public Corporation in British Nationalized Industry, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 534, 537 (1949).
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nevertheless a hard core of truth in the assertion that most elusive,
nebulous, and frequently abused concept "the national interest"
may sometimes point in a different direction from that indicated
by the needs of a public corporation considered in isolation. Hence
in the last resort the Minister must be able to override the board.119
The problem, then, is to preserve a governmental voice on issues
of national concern while maintaining autonomy. It may be possible
to preserve essential autonomy by limiting the ministerial power to
overrule to those situations where the public interest genuinely
demands it. If discretion over rates, operations, and the like is vested
primarily in the corporation's board (with whatever specific exceptions might be essential, such as continuation of unprofitable services), with the governmental authority to overrule exercisable only
when the national interest so demands, and then only by formal
direction of the minister, there is at least a political check on such
exercise:
It may be argued that in present-day Britain with its regulated
economy and narrow margins it is inevitable that the government of
the day will want to control by one method or another the price
and wage policies of nationalized industries.... But I do not accept
this contention nor the premises on which it is based. The determination of wages and prices in nationalized industries should not
normally be a political matter at all. The government should intervene only when they are prepared to accept full and formal responsibility to the public and to Parliament for the decision. If this
principle were to be accepted there would be a notable reduction in
the "political" element in most decisions about wages and prices
except on comparatively rare occasions.120
Direct parliamentary control over the nationalized industries
is exercised primarily in the initial drafting of the corporate charters
and associated statutes. This area of control is expanded by the
practice of questioning the minister in Parliament, to the extent
questions are admissible and are in fact answered by the minister.
Parliamentary procedure offers two points at which questions may be
rejected: they may be refused by the Speaker through the clerks of
the House, or the minister may himself refuse to answer them. The
extent of admissibility of questions on nationalized industries has
been the subject of contention, some taking the view that the ultimate responsibility of ministers justifies a rule that virtually all
119. ROBSON, supra note 96, at 158.
120. Id. at 160. But see Albu, supra note 11!1, at 110-12 (suggesting a semi-independent board, with policy clearly in ministerial hands).
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questions should be allowed and others arguing that unrestricted
questioning would in effect destroy the necessary independence of
these corporations.121 It is difficult to demonstrate that expanding
the scope of inquiry by Parliament would affect adversely the performance of the nationalized industries, but the history of the
United States Post Office strongly suggests that detailed legislative
control can have substantial inhibiting effects. But expanded questioning appears likely: the clerks of Commons now reject only
repetitive questions and those concerning details of administration;
all others must be answered or refused by the minister on the floor
of the House. Members of Parliament have developed ways of circumventing these rules and, occasionally, of forcing answers to
questions. In short, although Parliament spends less time and inquires in less detail into the nationalized industries than do Congress
and its committees into governmental departments, the degree of
control exercised, particularly when added to the influence of the
ministers, is substantial and often detailed.122
As the public enterprise is granted greater autonomy the question
of how to assure financial accountability becomes critical. The
Public Accounts Committee of Parliament has authority to examine
financial reports submitted to Parliament, but the authority to examine and certify or to audit is granted to the Auditor General only
as to those corporations wholly or mainly dependent on money voted
by Parliament. Most of the nationalized industries are thereby excluded. It has been suggested that this should be remedied by creation of an audit commission to report to the Standing Committee
on Nationalized Industries; this commission would perform a full
efficiency audit, apparently much like the studies of the Comptroller
General of the United States. It has been contended that financial
accountability through such efficiency audits in addition to accountability through ministers and directly to Parliament would tend to:
(1) satisfy the government and the public that the nationalized
industries are being run efficiently and progressively; (2) prevent
exploitation of consumers through use of monopolistic position; and
(3) prevent work stoppages due to bad labor relations.123 Accountability, however, is inextricably intertwined with control, and experience ·with the United States General Accounting Office124 suggests
that the very existence of such an audit organ, unless it were circum121.
122.
123.
124.

See ROBSON, supra note 96, at 163-66, 169-75.
Id. at 175-76, 181-83.
Id. at 195, 203-06, 210-11.
See Lilienthal &: Marquis, supra note 99, at 577-86.
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scribed in the scope of its activities, might unduly extend detailed
control by the government.
B. The Tennessee Valley Authority

Public corporations in the United States date back to the Bank of
North America, created by the Continental Congress in 1781. The
First and Second Banks of the United States were also public corporations.120 Use of the public corporation as an arm of the government began in earnest during World War I, with the creation of
such corporations as the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the War
Finance Corporation. 126 Perhaps the most successful American public
corporation, and surely the most carefully analyzed, is the Tennessee
Valley Authority, chartered by statute in 1933.127 Moreover, TVA
remains unique among federally chartered public corporations in
its independence and business oriented control structure. Curiously,
despite the success of the TVA, the government corporation has not
until recently found wider use.128
The Tennessee Valley Authority is a corporation; and though
corporate status per se does not carry special rights or privileges, it
is clear that use of the corporate form was intended to confer considerable freedom, approaching that of a private commercial company.120 At its head is a full-time, three-man board of directors, with
staggered nine-year terms, named by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. The President designates the chairman thereof, but all
other officials, agents, and employees are selected by the board or its
delegates. 130 In the early days of TVA, the board members attempted
to act both as policymakers and as administrators. The experience,
under Chairman Arthur Morgan, progressed from the merely confusing to the absolutely disastrous. Initially, the three directors split
up the operations of TVA into three areas of total responsibility. Al125. For a listing of early public corporations in the United States, see Note, supra
note 118.
U. PA. L. REv. 534 (1949).
126. Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 99, at 547-48.
127. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-83ldd (1964).
128. Other "valley authorities," modeled after the TVA, were proposed as public
corporations in bills introduced in the mid-1940's. None of the proposals was passed.
See Clark, Proposed "Valley Authority" Legislation, 40 AM. PoL. Ser. R.Ev. 62 (1946).
In each of these proposals, key features of TVA-civil service exemption, bond financing, and corporate status-were included. Id. at 62-63, 67-68, 70. The Corporation for
Public Broadcasting, authorized by Public Law 90-129 (May 26, 1967) is similar to
TVA in the degree of its autonomy, but without authority to raise funds by sale of
bonds. Id. § 396.
129. See H.R. REP. No. 130, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1933); Swidler, Legal Foundations, in T.V.A.-THE Fmsr TWENTY YEARS 16, 26-29 (R. Martin ed. 1956).
ll!O. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831a & b (1964).
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though one commentator suggests the possibility that the early
spectacular achievement of TVA may be attributable to this organization,131 the division of responsibility, together with the varying
philosophies of the board members and Chairman Morgan's domineering personality, led ultimately to President Roosevelt's removal
of Morgan and an unusually bitter congressional investigation of
TVA. 132 The upshot of the Morgan affair was confirmation of the
President's authority to remove a board member. 133 But the controversy left TVA's autonomy in all other respects unaffected, and 1937
saw the establishment, over Morgan's objections, of a General
Manager as the chief administrative officer of TVA.134
The uniqueness of TVA lies in the board's responsibility and
independence, delegated in turn through the General Manager
into the organization. The corporation is specifically exempted from
the civil service laws, and this exemption is coupled with a powerful injunction against the use of political influence:
In the appointment of officials and the selection of employees for
said Corporation, and in the promotion of any such employees or
officials, no political test or qualifications shall be permitted or
given consideration, but all such appointments and promotions shall
be given and made on the basis of merit and efficiency. Any member
of said board who is found by the President of the United States to
be guilty of a violation of this section shall be removed from office
by the President of the United States, and any appointee of said
board who is found by the board to be guilty of a violation of this
section shall be removed from office by said board.135

This statute attempted to preserve the best of the civil service system
-merit promotions and elimination of the spoils system-while
avoiding the inhibiting influences of standardized examinations,
uniform pay scales, and cumbersome dismissal procedures. Initiation
of such a system was an act of confidence; the virtually absolute exclusion of politics from TVA and the unusually high morale and
devotion of TVA employees have borne out this trust. 136 Added flexibility is found in at least three areas: wages and salaries (TVA has
nonetheless tended to follow the civil service lead on salaries and
131. See C. PRITCHE1T, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 156-57 (1943).
132. For the details of this important early development in TVA, see id. at 186-216.
133. Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).
134. See PRITCHE1T, supra note 131, at 163-70; Oliver, Administrative Foundations,
in -T.V.A.-THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 35, 39-42 (R. Martin ed. 1956).
135. 16 U.S.C. § 831a (1964). Compare the proposed provisions to preclude political
influence in the naming of postmasters discussed in note 85 supra.
136. See PRITCHE1T, supra note 131, at 267-71, 282-83; Case, Personnel Administration, in T.V.A.-THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 50, 52-55 (R. Martin ed. 1956).
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is required to pay prevailing area wages), 137 hiring standards and
procedures,138 and firing. 130 The TVA has developed a decentralized
personnel administration by which supervisors select those they wish
to hire from a list and are then held responsible for the work of their
employees; dismissal and appeals procedures are similarly localized,
starting with the employee's immediate supervisor. 140 Moreover,
labor relations-by any standard-have been particularly good.141
Clearly, TVA cannot be allowed complete autonomy in its operations, and the means of congressional and executive control are
several. As with the British nationalized industries, the most powerful means of control is legislation; in both situations this has been
used sparingly and with little inhibiting effect on autonomy.142 The
Statute itself grants very broad discretion to the TVA board. But
since the TVA program is not fully self-supporting, a potential area
of control is appropriations. 143 In some respects, the financial limitations of TVA parallel those of governmental departments: it submits a budget, some seventeen months in advance of the beginning
of the fiscal year, to the Bureau of the Budget, and that budget is
included in the President's budget passed on by Congress.144 But
there are critical differences in the financial structure of TVA as
compared with governmental departments. By contrast with other
government agencies, TVA receives most of its appropriation in a
lump sum available for all programs and not limited to one fiscal
year. 145 Moreover, bond financing is a potential source of financial
independence, even though the original statute was so drawn as to
137. 16 U.S.C. § 831b (1964). TVA is still subject, however, to veterans' preferences,
anti-communist provisions, and some other restrictions. See Case, supra note 136, at
52-53.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 831b (1964).
139. See PRITCHEIT, supra note 131, at 295.
140. See Case, supra note 136, at 55-56.
141. Thompson, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service-The T.V.A. Experience and Its Implications for Other Government Agencies, 17 LAB. L.J. 89, 90-91
(1966).
142. See PRITCHE'IT, supra note 131, at 229-30. Indeed, subsequent legislation has
increased TVA's independence in some areas. See text accompanying note 150 infra.
143. Even a self-supporting organization, like several of the nationalized industries,
is subject to audit and other investigatory controls. Indeed, even a private corporation
vested with a public interest will be subject to legislative or administrative control,
often by a regulatory commission. The appropriations "lever" is clearly not essential
to the exercise of such control, but it often makes possible control of the excruciatingly detailed type that is now applied to the Post Office.
144. See Clark, Financial Administration, in T.V.A.-THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 62,
64-68 (R. Martin ed. 1956).
145. Jones, The Financing of TVA, 26 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 725, 730-31 (1961).
Compare the subdivided, time-limited appropriations of the Post Office discussed in
the text accompanying note 34 supra.
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render the use of bond financing quite unlikely. 146 However, in connection with the TVA's acquisition of the power facilities of the
Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, Congress authorized the
issuance of $61.5 million worth of bonds; these were issued to the
United States Treasury in 1939-1941.147
Still, an early commentator was disturbed at the inadequate use
of bond financing and the failure to make provision for repayment
of congressional appropriations and payment of some return thereon
to the Treasury.148 Although even the original act required TVA to
repay to the Treasury its net proceeds in excess of expenses (less a
reserve of $1 million), at least in the early years there was no
such excess to repay.149 The situation has changed greatly, both in
operations and in financing. Power and fertilizer operations began to
produce substantial revenues, so that by the end of fiscal year 1960,
TVA had paid pursuant to this section $185 million of power proceeds and $41.5 million of nonpower proceeds to the Treasury, in
addition to the repayment of the bonds issued in 1939-1941.150
Moreover, in 1959 TVA was given more general authority to borrow up to $750 million for power financing, since increased to $1.75
billion.151 As of June 30, 1966, debt outstanding under this section
was $385 million. 152 Of equal importance, the new section provides
for repayment beginning in fiscal year 1961, of the congressional appropriations investment in TVA at the rate of $10 million annually
for five years, $15 million for the next five, and $20 million thereafter, until $1 billion has been repaid. In addition, TVA now must
pay a return on the net appropriations investment equal to the
average interest rate payable by the Treasury on its public obligations as of the beginning of the fiscal year.153 In 1967, payments
were $62.125 million under this section: $15 million as repayment,
and $47.125 million as a return (4.134 per cent on an investment
of $1.14 million) on appropriations. The results of such repayments
have been dramatic: in 1956, the portion of the power investment
146. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831n, 83ln-1 (1964); see PRITCHETI, supra note 131, at 236-37.
147. 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-3 (1964); see PRITCHETT, supra note 131, at 238.
148. Id. at 238-41.
149. 16 U.S.C. § 83ly (1964); see PRITCHETI, supra note 131, at 235-36.
150. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT A-11 (1960), A-9 (1961).
151. 73 Stat. 280 (1959), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(a) (Supp. II 1965-1966).
Note that these bonds are not obligations of the United States Government nor are
they guaranteed by the Treasury; and while the Treasury has authority to defer
issuance of such bonds, its authority is limited. See note 195 infra.
152. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT A-14 (1966).
153. 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(e) (1964). See Jones, supra note 145, at 737-39. Similar requirements are imposed on the British nationalized industries. THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC OBUGATIONS OF THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES, CMND. No. 1337, at 4-5 (1961).
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represented by appropriations was seventy-seven per cent; by the
end of fiscal 1966, it was less than fifty-two per cent. Appropriations
now no longer are applied in any significant measure to power programs, but rather go toward the other aspects of TVA operations; 154
indeed, in 1966 total TVA appropriations of $59 million were very
nearly matched by returns of the power program of over $58 million.155 In short, profitability of the power program and increased
use of bond financing-with concomitant elimination of reliance on
appropriations except as to nonpower programs-have reduced the
congressional lever of appropriations as a means of control, at least
as to the power programs,156 and possibly as to other programs as
well.
But control in the fiscal area does not stop at appropriations: the
statute also requires TVA to file an annual report and confers audit
authority on the Comptroller General.157 The importance of audit by
the General Accounting Office (headed by the Comptroller General)
lies in its authority to "settle and adjust accounts" under the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended. 158 Acting as an arm of
Congress, the Comptroller General may retroactively disallow expenditures; he exercises this authority broadly, inquiring into the
details of legality and appropriateness of all expenditures and
disallowing in toto items on which he has any question. 159 Shortly
after establishment of TVA, issue was joined between TVA and the
General Accounting Office on the extent of the latter's audit authority under the TVA Act, with the result that in 1941 the TVA
Act was amended to prevent the Comptroller General from disallowing expenses determined by the TVA board to be necessary to carry
out the provisions of the Act. 160 Since then, TVA's accounting system
154. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 52-53 (1966).
155. Id. at A-11.
156. Of special interest, perhaps, in contemplating a TVA-type setup for the Post
Office Department is our power financing. TVA exercise its highest degree of
autonomy in the management of its power system since it is financed for all practical purposes from power revenues and borrowings, and congressional appropriations are not required. However, as I have indicated, TVA keeps Congress and the
President's office fully informed of its activities in the power field through its annual
report and its annual budget submissions.
Letter from Aubrey J. Wagner, Chairman of the Board of Directors, TVA, to Thomas
L. Smithson, Jan. 8, 1968, on file in the author's office.
157. 16 U.S.C. § 831h (1964).
158. 31 u.s.c. §§ 71, 74 (1964).
159. See Lilienthal &: Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal
Government, 54 HARv. L. REv. 545, 577-79 (1941).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 83lh(b) (1964). See PRITCHETr, supra note 131, at 249-63, for the
history of the GAO-TVA dispute. Another important area of independence written
into the same section of the Act is freedom from the usual government purchasing
requirements.
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and procedures have been highly praised by the General Accounting
Office and others; 161 more important, however, the flexibility afforded
by freedom from accounting to the General Accounting Office
for specific expenditures in accordance with appropriations162 has
allowed for the development of a genuinely useful accounting system.
Resulting financial statements are similar to commercial statements,
and in addition they break down operations into meaningful activities for which costs are separately accumulated: for example, power,
fertilizer, agricultural and munitions developments, and flood control operations.163
C. Evaluating TVA and the Nationalized Industries
In evaluating TVA and the British nationalized industries, it is
essential at the outset to realize that there is no general agreement
on either the criteria of evaluation or the benchmarks against which
any comparative evaluation should be made. Profitability, the
market-place standard of evaluating private industries, suffers from
obvious defects. It is not the primary aim of the public corporation.
Moreover, income or deficit may turn on the extent of public-service
subsidy, the degree to which monopoly position is exploited or ignored in pricing, the quality and extent of service provided, and
other factors not reflective of the total performance of the enterprise.
A more nebulous, less quantifiable standard must be applied: the
effectiveness and economy with which the ends sought from the corporation are pursued, and the degree to which they are achieved.164
Application of such a standard is confused by the multiplicity of
numerical criteria it comprehends (output in kilowatt-hours, price
and costs, employment, and capital investment, among others), by
the nonquantifiable standards that must be included (for example,
worker satisfaction, fulfillment of purposes, and public attitudes), and
by the lack of uniformity in standards of comparison. Some activities
of TVA, such as power production, may be compared with private
161. See Clark, supra note 144, at 68. From 1938 to 1944, TVA was audited by a
firm of independent certified public accountants, but in 1945 TVA, along with other
government agencies, was prohibited from making expenditures for outside auditors.
31 U.S.C. § 866(d) (1964). The 1959 bond authorization amendments to the TVA Act
permitted resumption of audits by certified public accountants in fiscal year 1960.
16 u.s.c. § 83ln-4(c) (1964). See TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REl>ORT A-2
(1960).
162. See the criticism of GAO examinations in Beach, Role of the General Accounting Office in the Regulation of Industry, 21 Bus. LAW 235 (1965); Lilienthal 8: Marquis,
supra note 159, at 581-84.
163. See TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REl>ORT A-1 through A-14 (1966).
164. See w. ROBSON, NATIONAUZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 416-24 (1960).
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industry (although not without considerable objection from private
power producers) or public power authorities, but it would be difficult to develop any comparative standard for reforestation, flood
control, and many other activities. It is traditional to compare performance of the British nationalized industries with the same industries before nationalization, but this comparison may be unfair in
failing to take account of general progress in industry; and, it is
nearly impossible to draw meaningful comparisons between these
industries and other totally different industries that have not been
nationalized.
That the TVA has been remarkably successful in achieving its
purposes can hardly be seriously disputed at this date, notwithstanding doubts about standards of comparison. In thirty years, its system
of river control has averted flood damage of more than one-third of
a billion dollars, at a saving of some $140 million even after
all capital and operating costs of flood control are deducted.165 TVA
saves shippers nearly $30 million annually by maintaining a shipping channel, and its early optimistic forecasts of river traffic
have been substantially exceeded.166 Achievements in electric power
generation are the most impressive: TVA has met heavy power
demands for defense, industry, and home use. Average residential
use of electricity in the valley is over twice the national average, and
cost per kilowatt-hour (including a return of more than four per
cent to the government on its entire power investment) is less than
half the nationwide average.167 The power investment of the government, as we have noted, is gradually being repaid, and the government is being paid a return on this investment as well. Achievements
in the development and use of new fertilizers, forest development,
munitions, and regional employment have been similarly impressive.168 It would be erroneous to suggest that corporate form caused
TVA to be successful. By the same token, there can be little doubt
that greater fiscal autonomy, freedom of personnel policy, and inde165. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTIIORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1966); Martin, The Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study of Federal Control, 22 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 351,
361-62 (1957).
166. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT I (1966); Martin, supra note
165, at 362.
167. Average cost per kilowatt-hour in 1966 was .90¢, contrasted with the national
average of 2.22¢. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTIIORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1966). Some portion of TVA's lower costs, however, result from its lower cost of raising capital and
its reduced tax burden. Taxes and interest together amount to nearly one-third of the
power revenues of private power companies. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT 206-07 (1967).
168. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTIIORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 3, 7-11 (1966); Martin, supra
note 165, at 365-70.
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pendence from detailed government control have contributed importantly to the initiative, flexibility, and sense of mission that have
led to TVA's successes.169
The job of taking over and remaking an existing industry in
unhappy straits is obviously more difficult than the task posed by an
operation started with a clean slate. Without detracting from the
significance of TVA's performance, it should be obvious that the job
of the nationalized industries-and the task to be faced by any reorganized Po~t Office-must be considerably more difficult. The
nationalized industries have not fared as well as TVA. Their record
is inconclusive, and some claim that their performance on the whole
has been uninspired,170 perhaps to some extent because they have had
(by virtue of the substantial governmental control previously noted)
little of the free rein that has characterized TVA.171 In several respects, the industries have done quite well: the airlines (BOAC and
BEA) have provided generally good service; production, working
conditions, and wages have improved significantly in the coal mines
since nationalization; and nationalized electricity has turned in a
remarkably effective and efficient record. Gas operations show a
mixed record: production is efficient but sales are disappointing,
due in part-it is claimed by some-to underpricing and overutilization of electricity.172 Finally, the British Transport Commission produced enormous deficits regularly, caused directly by government intervention in prices; the lack of any degree of commercial
freedom given to the railroads led to disastrous results. Ultimately,
the Commission was abolished in a decentralization program and
over-all control was vested in the Minister of Transport.173
No study definitively establishes a causal relationship between
autonomy and efficiency, but the public corporations examined above,
together with the United States Post Office, afford some empirical
support for a conclusion that most businessmen would derive from
169. "The freedom and flexibility given to the Directors of TVA in the organic
Act and the responsible exercise of that authority by the Board have been major factors
in the achievements of TVA in carrying out its assigned responsibilities." Letter, supra
note 156.
170. Davies, Who Decides the Public Interest?, in THE LEssoNs OF PUBUC ENTERPRISE
243-44 (M. Shanks ed. 1963); Shanks, The Future of Public Enterprise, in THE LEss0NS
OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 300 (M. Shanks ed. 1963).
171. See Shanks, Islands of Socialism, in THE LEssONS OF PUBUC ENTERPRISE 219-20
(M. Shanks ed. 1963).
172. ROBSON, supra note 164, at 436-46.
173. Four public authorities and a holding company took the place of the British
Transport Commission. Responsibility for rail transportation is now divided among
six regional boards. Transport Act of 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 46, §§ 1, 2, 29; see Shanks,
The Aims and the Problems, in THE LEssoNs OF Puauc ENTERPRISE 30-31 (M. Shanks
ed. 1963); ROBSON, supra note 164, at 150-54, 456.
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common sense. Efficiency in conducting whatever task is assigned
tends to suffer as the alternative courses of action and the freedom of
choice of the managers are limited. Parliament and the Cabinet ministers have less information, less time, and less ability to determine
rail rates consistent with break-even operation than the managers
of the railroads. Political advisors cannot and do not pick local
postmasters to maximize the efficiency of the Post Office Department,
and Congress cannot, in the first instance, do as effective a job of
choosing a location for a dam or power plant as TVA experts. To be
sure, many such decisions may involve issues of the public interest,
and some may demand review or even initiation by the legislature.
At some point, however, performance is compromised by excessive
intervention; and it seems clear that the formula for facilitating the
carrying out of the industry's job is maximum autonomy consistent
with the maintenance of overriding public policy. 174 That the Post
Office does not fit this formula hardly needs elaboration.
In generalizing from these illustrations, some caution is in order.
Use of the corporate form, as such, will not assure success nor even
necessarily facilitate it. The powers and control structure of the enterprise determine its ability to carry on whatever purposes have
been entrusted to it. If anything clear emerges from these histories,
it is that vesting an organization with appropriate powers can in fact
facilitate-through greater autonomy, creativity, and flexibilitymore effective performance of its job. Without adequate controls,
a public corporation might act contrary to the public interest; with
overly tight limitations, the corporate device becomes largely useless
and the organization loses whatever added effectiveness autonomy
can provide.
It will be argued by some that all, or nearly all, of the virtues of a
public postal corporation can be achieved by reorganization without
a corporation. Obviously that is true. The common law could have
fared well with a limited-liability, perpetual-life, delegated-responsibility, transferable-share partnership in the place of the corporation.
The corporate device institutionalizes these characteristics as well as
others, and the public corporation in the same way affords an institutional framework to which the desired characteristics may be attached.
It might also be true that the symbolic act of establishing a new
174. This position was explicitly adopted by the British Select Committee on Nationalised Industries in their recommendations concerning government control of
the proposed British postal corporation. The Committee rejected increased government
control based on historical reasons or on notions of unusual monopoly position, and
favored vesting initial authority over rates in the corporation. SELEcr Cm,u.mTEE REPORT
194-97.
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entity would lend impetus to the reorganization effort. Reorganization could indeed be carried out without a corporation, but the job
would be more difficult.

IV. THE

POST OFFICE AS A PUBLIC CORPORATION

A. The Background of the Corporation Proposal
The genesis of the present round of discussions concerning incorporating the Post Office was a proposal made last April by Postmaster General Lawrence O'Brien in a Washington address to a
meeting of magazine editors and publishers.175 Claiming that the Post
Office Department had grmvn in self-destructive ways, he concluded:
[T]here are so many existing and formidable barriers to efficient
management that the ultimate solution to the problems of the
postal service lies in taking the Department out of its present context entirely.... This is a situation that has grown up over such
a long period of time and has such a strong tradition, that the only
effective action I foresee is s,veeping it away entirely.
O'Brien's proposal is sweeping, and at least a few of its points have
been the subject of considerable dispute. He proposes that the
Postal Service should:
(1)
(2)
·
(3)
(4)

cease to be a part of the President's Cabinet;
become a nonprofit government corporation, rendering essential
public service;
provide postal services authorized by the Congress;
be operated by a board of directors, appointed by the President,
and confirmed by the Congress;
(5) be managed by a professional executive appointed by the board;
(6) be given a clear mandate on the percentage of cost coverage for
postal services, so that further revisions in rates-should they
be necessary-would be made on a fixed formula basis.
His proposal seems to contemplate as well exemption from the civil
service system for he envisions payment of employees according to
the standards of comparable industry, with greater scope for collective bargaining. Finally, he suggests the possibility of bond financing
for the construction of post office buildings.
That the Postmaster General's proposal had been carefully considered by the Executive Branch was obvious: within five days, the
President established a Commission on Postal Organization with
the following broad mandate:
175. Address by Postmaster General Lawrence O'Brien Before a Meeting of the
Magazine Publishers Ass'n and the American Soc'y of Magazine Editors, April 3, 1967.
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[The Commission shall] study the organization and structure of the
postal service of the United States, and ... determine and report
upon the feasibility and desirability of a transfer of the postal
service from the Post Office Department to a Government corporation,
or such other form of organization as the Commission may consider desirable.11a
The Commission is directed to consider organization and management, rates, compensation, personnel practices, financing, and modernization, among other factors. Any recommendation against a
transfer to a government corporation or other form of organization
must be accompanied by reasons and by alternative proposed improvements; a recommendation in favor of a transfer must include
consideration of the nature and relationship of the organization to
the President, the Congress, and the public. In addition, recommendations must be made concerning composition and appointment
of top management, methods of setting postal rates, compensation,
employment policies and labor relations, transportation, financing,
and any other relevant issues. The Commission was given one year
to prepare a final report. Its ten members, chaired by Frederick
Kappel (former chairman of the board of American Telephone &
Telegraph Company), reflect the magnitude of its task: they include
the Dean of the Harvard Business School, the Board Chairman or
President of five major corporations, the Vice-President of the Ford
Foundation, a distinguished Washington attorney, and the President
of the AFL-CIO.
This proposal to consider reorganization of the Post Office as
a public corporation is not ·without precedent. The German Federal
Post, though not technically established as a body corporate, has at
least a few of the attributes of a corporation.177 Moreover, the Postmaster General's proposal was preceded by a British White Paper
outlining the impending change of status of the British Post Office
to a public corporation.178 Finally, the 1949 Hoover Commission
Report, though generally viewed as favoring less autonomy for public
corporations, 170 nevertheless recommended use of at least some of the
attributes of such an organization (such as a revolving fund and a
business-type budget) for the Post Office.180 Still, the organization
176. Exec. Order No. 11341, 32 Fed. Reg. 5765 (April 8, 1967).
177. The Bundespost is administered by a federal minister, but its board sets postal
rates, budgets, and major technical plans. It is a self-supporting special fund. See
Friedmann & Hufnagel, The Public Corporation in Various States: Germany, in THE
PunLic CORPORATION 159-60 (W. Friedmann ed. 1954).
178. REORGANISATION OF THE POST OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233 (1967).
179. See, e.g., Hanson, Regional Survey: North America, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
34-35 (A. Hanson ed. 1954).
180. 1949 HOOVER COMMISSION, THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 11-14.
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proposed by the Postmaster General is in many ways unique. For
aside from long history as a government department and sheer sizethe United States Post Office dwarfs that of any other country-incorporation of the Post Office would follow hard on the heels of
developing governmental distrust of public corporations and a sharp
decline in their use in the United States.
In the period before World War II, the use of public corporations by the federal government increased substantially; by 1945 the
General Accounting Office counted some fifty-eight federal corporations or groups of corporations of various types.181 The proliferation
of these corporations was due in large part to the desire for greater
autonomy in operations and also in part to attempts to avoid uncertainty of congressional action in the establishment of a new
agencies.182 With the onset of the war, Congress paid greater attention
to these corporations and began the process of chipping away at their
autonomy. The Ramspeck Act of 1940 drew the employees of every
federal government corporation, with the exception of TVA, into the
classified civil service.183 Then in 1941, Congress established the
Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures, which reported in 1944 on government corporations, recommending that:
(I) the corporations be required to present a business-type budget
to the Bureau of the Budget;
(!) the budget be submitted to Congress, and acted upon as Congress
acts on appropriations;
(3) the General Accounting Office be given authority to audit the
corporations; and
(4) the Comptroller General of the United States be made auditor
and comptroller, ex officio, of every government corporation.
This last recommendation was not agreed to by the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Director of the Budget, and it was not included
in the bill drafted in response to the report.184 Nevertheless, the
initial bills introduced185 would virtually have eliminated all meaningful freedom of action, with the following language:
181. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REFERENCE MANUAL OF GOVERNMENT CORPORA·
TIONS III, s. Doc. No. 86, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
182. See Pritchett, The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 Allf. POL.
Ser. R.Ev. 495, 496 (1946).
183. 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964) authorized the President of the United States to cover
such employees by Executive Order. This was done under Exec. Order No. 8743, as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964).
184. JOINT COllfM. ON REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES, REPORT ON
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, s. Doc. No. 227, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1944).
185. Three identical bills were introduced: S. 469, H.R. 2051, and H.R. 2177, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
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Sec. 104. No wholly owned Government corporation shall transact
' any business in any fiscal year except such business as is authorized
by Act of Congress as a part of its budget program for such fiscal
year, and no expenditures for administrative expenses in any fiscal
year shall be made by any such corporation except in the amounts
authorized and made available by Congress for such fiscal year. No
funds so made available by the Congress for administrative expenses shall be obligated or expended unless and until an appropriation account shall have been established therefore pursuant to an
appropriation warrant or a covering warrant, and funds so made
available shall be subject to apportionment by the Bureau of the
Budget, and claims and accounts thereunder to adjustment and
settlement by the General Accounting Office under title III of the
Budget and Accounting Act, 1921.
The limitations of this section-fiscal year budgeting and settlement
of accounts by the General Accounting Office-as noted by witnesses
at hearings on the bills, would have rendered impossible businesslike
operations of the corporations. 186 The revised bill specifically took
account of the corporations' demand for a degree of fiscal autonomy: 1s1
Sec. 104. The Budget programs transmitted by the President to
the Congress shall be considered and, if necessary, legislation shall
be enacted making available such funds or other financial resources
as the Congress may determine. The provisions of this section shall
not be construed as preventing wholly owned Government corporations from carrying out and financing their activities as authorized
by existing law, nor shall any provisions of this section be construed
as affecting in any way the provisions of section 26 of the Tennessee
Valley Authority Act, as amended. The provisions of this section
shall not be construed as affecting the existing authority of any wholly
owned Government corporation to make contracts or other commitments without reference to fiscal year limitations.
While this section as enacted did not, therefore, impose fiscal year
limitations on the corporations, the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945,188 of which it formed a part, sufficiently restricted
186. Hearings on S. 469 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Board of TVA),
122 CToseph Mehaffey, President of the Panama Railroad Company) (1945). See Pritchett,
supra note 182, at 498-99, 501.
187. H.R. 3660, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); see H.R. REP. No. 856, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1945). Note that § 26 of the TVA Act is 16 U.S.C. § 83ly (1964), effectively
permitting the TVA to use its receipts for the carrying on of its programs.
188. 31 U.S.C. §§ 841-69 (1964). Note that a 1947 amendment to the Act changed the
quoted section to allow Congress to place limitations on the use of corporate funds as
well as appropriations: "legislation shall be enacted making necessary appropriations,
as may be authorized by law, making available for expenditure for operating and administrative expenses such corporate funds or other financial resources or limiting the
use thereof as the Congress may determine ••••" 31 U.S.C. § 849 (1964) (emphasis
added).
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the freedom of public corporations that one contemporary authority
claimed that "the pattern of control imposed means that, for good or
ill, American experience with autonomous public corporations is
substantially at an end." 189
Though Congress may obviously exempt any postal corporation
from the Government Corporation Control Act-TVA is exempted
from parts of that Act and the Ramspeck Act190-an examination of
the nature of the Act's controls is useful in determining the usual
ground rules for government corporations, for which it may be expected Congress will argue if any postal reorganization is proposed.
The focus of the Act is exclusively financial: it deals with budgeting,
audits, and debt financing. The budget provisions, though they do
not tie expenditures to fiscal years, do require all wholly owned government corporations, including those that are totally self-supporting,
to present annual budgets for congressional consideration.191 In
prescribing a business-type budget, Congress recognized the difference
in function between these corporations and government departments
and, implicitly, the legitimacy of the corporate device to carry out
the business-type operations of the government; but these sections
were intended to, and did, curtail fiscal autonomy. The provisions for audit by the General Accounting Office similarly represent
a compromise: control was increased, but to a level significantly lower
than that exercised over government departments. Particularly significant was deletion of "settlement authority" of the General Accounting Office as proposed in the initial bills; this paralleled the outcome
of the General Accounting Office dispute with the TVA on this issue,
previously discussed.192 The General Accounting Office is to perform
annual audits "in accordance with the principles and procedures
applicable to commercial corporate transactions" and report to
Congress thereon. 193 Finally, the Control Act vests control over debt
financing of government corporations in the Secretary of the Treasury.194 This absolute power-which might be exercised by the
Treasury, for example in a period of financial stress, to the clear detri189. Pritchett, supra note 182, at 509.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964) specifically excludes TVA from civil service coverage. The
limitations of § 104 of the Government Corporation Control Act are similarly inapplicable to TVA [31 U.S.C. § 849 (1964)); and the prohibition against private audits of
31 U.S.C. § 866(d) (1964) is expressly negated in the TVA Act, 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(c)
(1964).
191. 31 u.s.c. §§ 847-49 (1964).
192. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
193. 31 u.s.c. § 850-51 (1964).
194. 31 u.s.c. § 868 (1964).
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ment of the corporation-should be contrasted with the clearly
limited veto given the Treasury in TVA bond financing. 195
Autonomy was clearly limited in the fiscal area by the Government
Corporation Control Act, and the Ramspeck Act limited corporate
freedom over personnel policy. It remains to be determined whether
these elements of autonomy, or others, are critical to an efficient
postal operation, and whether exemption from aspects of these acts
will be necessary.

B. Details of a Postal Corporation
It is beyond the purview of this Article, and perhaps beyond the
capabilities of any before-the-fact study, to prescribe with precision
the details of a reorganization plan for the Post Office. Accordingly,
this analysis will be concerned with a few of the most fundamental
issues that any such reorganization must consider: distribution of
control between Congress and the proposed corporation, personnel
policies, and finance.

I. Management and Control
The propos1t1on that organizational efficiency will increase if
rules which preclude desirable courses of conduct are eliminated
needs little proof. Many of the rules under which the Post Office now
operates are archaic and unduly restrictive, 196 and if reorganization
does nothing but eliminate these rules it will have made a step
forward. Beyond the elimination of undesirable restrictions, however,
there is a major institutional effect of distributing control more
widely throughout an enterprise. Though an occasional voice has
been raised against the view that autonomy in business-type operations of the government is desirable, 197 both history and empirical
research put its desirability beyond doubt. Freedom from many details of government control has characterized the highly successful
operations of TVA, government corporations in many nations, and
195. 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(c) (1964) gives TVA power to set terms, rates, and conditions
of its obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury must receive fifteen days' notice of
proposed issuance of obligations with a term of one year or more. If the Secretary does
not approve the issue-he may pass only on the time of issuance and the maximum
interest rate-the Treasury must provide interim financing to TVA up to $150 million.
If agreement on issuance is not then reached within eight months, TVA may sell
bonds without Treasury approval.
196. See, e.g., text accompanying note 63 supra.
197. See, e.g., Seidman, The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation:
4. Critical Appraisal, 12 PUB. AD. REv. 89, 93-96 (1952).
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local authorities in the United States.198 While it is difficult to develop adequate theoretical measures of organizational effectiveness,
several recent studies have found a significant correlation between
the total control and its distribution in an organization and the
effectiveness of that organization.199 The "participative management"
advocates have produced impressive demonstrations of the favorable
organizational effects, over time, of moving from authoritative management toward greater participation in decision-making by lowerlevel employees.200 Studies such as these suggest the potentiality of
increasing the effectiveness of the Post Office by giving it greater
control over its operations and by allowing for the delegation of that
authority to a far greater extent than at present.
Control given to a postal corporation must, regardless of what
efficiency may demand, be limited by national policy. There is nevertheless a vast amount of freedom of action-so far withheld
-that can be afforded in the running of the postal system by
eliminating political appointments below cabinet level, by granting
freedom of choice in the location of new post offices, by allowing
greater freedom in transportation policy and contracting, and by reducing unnecessarily detailed controls over local operations. Even
some politically tinged powers, such as setting of postal rates, bond
financing authority, and possible exemption from civil service laws,
can to some measure be granted to the corporation without compromising genuine national interests.
Although a board of directors is not essential to a public corporation, it is a fixture of private corporations, and it serves functions
of a value not to be ignored by the Post Office.201 Inside, full-time
198. See generally THE PUBLIC CORPORATION (W. Friedmann ed. 1954); PUBLIC
ENTERPrusE (A. Hanson ed. 1954).
199. See Marcus &: Cafagna, Control in Modern Organizations 25 Pun. AD. REv. 121
(1965).
200. A landmark work is R. LIKERT, NEW PATTERNS OF MANAGEMENT (1961), the
themes of which are developed in greater depth in R. LIKERT, THE HUMAN ORGA•
NIZATION (1967). Likert finds that as management systems move from "System I" (ex•
ploitative-authoritative) to "System 4" (participative group) they tend to be more
productive and have lower costs and more favorable attitudes. Id. at 46. Moreover,
such variables as group loyalty, conflicts, motivation, and pressures are directly affected
by the management system. Id. at 75-77. A detailed study of two companies, generally
supporting Likert's thesis, is A. MARROW, D. BOWERS &: s. SEASHORE, MANAGEMENT BY
PARTICIPATION (1967). Doubts have been expressed concerning the universal application
of the "participative management" approach, particularly as to low-level employees
or old-line companies, but its effects have already been felt widely. See Albrook,
Participative Management: Time for a Second Look, FORTUNE, May 1967, at 166.
201. Among the most important of these are selection of executives, development
of corporate policy, and evaluation of performance. And while there is as much variation among boards as among business managers, the continuing functions of the board
in these areas have strongly affected the success of business enterprises. The consensus
among businessmen, at least, is that a capable and devoted board of directors is a
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members of the board set major policy and act as an internal control
on effectiveness; outside, part-time members-if they do their jobs
conscientiously-afford the corporation a diversity of views.202 To
these virtues, in the public corporation setting, is added the advantage of another layer of political insulation. If the President of
the United States names the board, and the board in turn names the
executives, as is the case in TVA, the executives are more likely to be
chosen for their ability to manage as opposed to their political attractiveness.203 It would be naive to suggest that political factors
would play no part in the naming of the board, but staggered terms of
a relatively substantial period would prevent the operation of a
complete spoils system and would also provide necessary continuity
of experience and knowledge. Experience shows that the nonpolitical
aspect of such a board would tend to be preserved by avoiding any
provision that its members be named in stated proportions from each
political party.204 In addition, the board should not include members
of the executive departments or ex officio members, such as the
Comptroller General. 205 Moreover, whatever controls are necessary
can as effectively be imposed by statute or regulation. Whether the
board should be large or small, full-time or part-time, and representative or not are important issues. Communications Satellite
Corporation, probably most accurately classified as a publicly
sponsored, regulated private corporation, has a representative board;
its fifteen members are named six by vote of the common-carrier
very valuable business asset. See, e.g., the case studies in J. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND
THEIR FUNCTIONS (1945) and the subsequent Harvard Business School Study, M. COPE·
LAND &: A. TOWL, THE BOARD OF DIREcrORS AND BUSINESS 1:lANAGEIIIENT (1947).
202. The longstanding dispute among corporate executives as to the relative value
of "inside" and "outside" directors-those who devote full time to the board's activities,
as contrasted with those for whom directorship is not an exclusive occupation-shows
no sign of abating. Arguments in favor of outside directors center on the virtues of
obtaining an outside, objective view of business affairs. The influence of outside directors is reduced to a substantial degree, however, by their inability to obtain full information on the operations of the corporation. See THE DIRECTOR LooKs AT HIS JoB
38-101 (C. Brown &: E. Smith ed. 1957). The only systematic study of the relationship
between corporate performance and the nature of the board of directors adduces persuasive evidence for its conclusion that inside-run directorates produce better corporate
performance than outside-run boards. s. VANCE, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND
PERFORIIIANCE 1-3, 44-61 (1964).
203. Note that the day-to-day affairs of TVA are under the direction of a General
Manager, appointed by the board. Early attempts to have the board assume direction of
both policy and operations were unsuccessful. See text accompanying notes 131-34 supra.
204. Such a provision tends to polarize the board, rather than to assure impartiality.
See J. THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
COUNTRIES 159-61 (1937).
205. Canadian public corporations have used this device, with strong critical disfavor. Hodgetts, The Public Corporation in Various States: Canada, in THE PUBLIC
CORPORATION 75-78 (W. Friedmann ed. 1954).
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shareholders, six by vote of public shareholders, and three by appointment by the President of the United States. 206 This attempt to
reflect various constituencies on the board has been sharply criticized
on theoretical and historical grounds, 207 and has the additional fault
of being contrary to the theory of a board as acting in the best
interests of the corporation and not individual constituents.208 While
part-time board members may bring useful perspectives to the new
corporation, it will be essential-at least at the outset-that a nucleus
of members be prepared to devote their full efforts to reorganization,
which only begins with the establishment of a corporation. Thus, a
board composed predominantly of full-time members appears desirable, probably no larger than necessary to assure continuity. A
nine-man board, with staggered terms, would be consistent with the
practice of the public corporations discussed earlier. 200
The board of the new British postal corporation will report to
the Postmaster General, a Cabinet official, in the same manner as the
boards of the nationalized industries.210 By contrast, direct accountability to Congress by public corporations in the United States avoids
the need for retention of such ministerial responsibility; indeed,
Postmaster General O'Brien's proposal contemplated the elimination
of his job.211 Moreover, the critical public interest aspects of postal
operations-type, distribution and frequency of service, postal rates,
and finances-can, to the extent necessary, be made the subject of
specific statutory criteria without the need for continued cabinetlevel intervention in the details of operations.
Is a board of directors essential, or merely desirable? Top-level
executive continuity is desirable, though perhaps not critical. But
insulation from political patronage and other influences unrelated
to postal operations, together with freedom from detailed control
over operations, is critical to any viable reorganization. Without a
board of directors and the insulation it gives to officers of the postal
service, a fixed-term Postmaster General might be a possible alternative, but a poor one: a chief executive subject to removal for political
206. This is so provided in the articles of incorporation, as required by 47 U.S.C.
See CoMN!UNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, PROSPEcrus 33-35 (1964).
207. See Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private CorporationThe Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 350, 363-64 (1965).
208. See 3 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 848 (1965); cf. Rostow,
§ 733 (1964).

To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE COR·
PORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (E. Mason ed. 1961).
209. A board of between five and fifteen members is large enough to assure diversity of outlook and experience without frustrating effective discussion. Cf. ROBSON,
supra note 164, at 213-15.
210. REORGANIZATION OF THE POST OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233, at 9 (1967).
211. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
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reasons cannot maintain autonomy. A board of directors would
assure necessary autonomy and political insulation, as well as desirable division between policy formation and its execution; it is an
essential element of any reorganization.

2. Personnel
The Ramspeck Act would require that all employees of a postal
corporation be within the classified civil service in the absence of a
statutory exemption.212 Ironically, the goals of the civil service lawselimination of nepotism and political influence, and emphasis on
merit-have in large part been perverted in the present Post Office
Department. Some specific reforms could eliminate the major shortcomings; at least a few of the proposed bills to eliminate political
appointment of postmasters would tend to eliminate deleterious
political influences generally, and help to provide hope of advancement for postal employees. 213 Unfortunately, the problem does not
stop there: remaining are the difficulties of uniform nationwide pay
scales, impediments to transfer from office to office, and the inability
of the Department to attract university trained potential managers
and executives. 214 While some of these problems can be mitigated by
changing Post Office Department regulations, most of them stem
from requirements of the civil service laws themselves. Exemption
from these laws is unusual, but not entirely without precedent: TVA,
exempted from the Ramspeck Act, has developed a personnel system
that has proved remarkably successful.215 Not the least of the advantages of this system has been the opportunity it provides-notwithstanding the bar against strikes-for genuine collective bargaining based on local wage scales, with the high degree of satisfaction this
has provided both management and labor. 216
Generalizing from TVA in this area has its dangers: the esprit
of that organization began with its initial organization and to some
degree results from the recognition by both labor and management
that they are an example for others. There is a vested interest in amicable relations, which no doubt affects negotiations favorably. Never212. 5 U.S.C. § 631a (1964).
213. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 12-22 supra.
215. The TVA Act provides only that the Board shall select all employees, and
that no political tests shall be applied. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831b, (1964). TVA has developed comprehensive regulations pursuant to this statutory grant, consistent with
the nature of its operations. TENNESSEE VALLEY -AUTIIORITY, ADMINISTRATIVE RELEASES
§ III (1967).
216. Thompson, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service-The T.V.A. Experience and Its Implications for Other Government Agencies, 17 LAB. L.J. 89 (1966).
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theless, it is important to recognize that TVA's personnel policy
represents an adaptation of the essentials of the civil service system to
the details of TVA's operation by allowing local wage rates, hiring on
the spot, and individualized hiring and supervision. And while
uniformity has its virtues, there seems little reason why it must prevail
over demonstrably different needs of a particular organization. So
with the Post Office: let it be granted that any organization for the
carrying on of United States government functions should assure a
fair, merit-based system of employment, advancement, and firing.
Does such a policy require, for example, that a nation-wide businesstype enterprise pay uniform wages, even if those wages make employment unattractive in some areas and a political plum in others?217
Local wage differentials are a matter of some sensitivity to organized
labor, but should not the issue be resolved by concentrated genuine
wage negotiations, rather than a restrictive and obviously unsuitable
statutory and regulatory scheme?
Labor relations must be the subject of another study, but a few
points should be noted. The Post Office as a national communications
network under over-all government control may not be able to risk
the threat of a strike. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine Congress
granting the right to strike under even the most liberal reorganization
plan. Nevertheless, some effective collective bargaining technique
must be developed, and although TVA has produced an enviable
labor relations record within the strike ban, a device such as compulsory arbitration binding on both parties may be essential to the Post
Office. Though no suggestion is offered herein, it must be recognized that if an approach like compulsory arbitration is adopted it
must appear in the corporation's charter and should therefore be
considered along with other elements of the reorganization plan.
Executives or managers are a second problem, and here the issue
is not area differentials, but flexibility in hiring, advancement, and
transfers. To some degree, the Department itself has been responsible
for creating a staid and unattractive image by offering little opportunity for either experienced managers or university graduates, and
by itself limiting transfers. Although the Department has taken some
first steps to change this pattern, more are required. 218 Attracting professional managers, engineers, and attorneys in the numbers needed
by the Post Office will require competitive starting salaries and working conditions, opportunities for substantial advancement commensurate with demonstrated ability, and possibly even compensation
217. See note 12 supra.
218. See note 18 supra.
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comparable to private industry positions of equal stature. These are
not within the possibilities of civil service employers: private industry
spirits away top executives by offering them substantial compensation and therefore holds them to a high standard of performance.
How can the Post Office expect to achieve similar performance when
it is limited to top pay of $27,900 in postal field positions, where
enormous job security is coupled with no upward mobility? 219 And,
more important, what overriding national policy demands these
limitations? Perhaps it would be uneconomic to have different statutory standards applicable to each government department or enterprise. But the Post Office is not just another department. It is the
government's largest civilian employer, and second in size only to the
armed forces, which have a separate personnel policy.220
Is exemption from the civil service laws essential, or merely operationally desirable? Clearly, elimination of political perversion of the
civil service system as it applies to the Post Office221 is absolutely
essential, for without that reform the Post Office remains the un·willing depositary of political favors. It is this observer's view that
exemption from the civil service is essential, at least for managerial
employees. Critics will respond by noting that other government
agencies, equally limited by the civil service pay scales, experience
requirements, and the like, have had no difficulty attracting talent.
This argument tends to stretch the truth. Top flight professionals
are attracted to certain government positions, but they tend to stay
only a few years, obtain needed experience, and move on to the
private sector. Government does have difficulty at least in retaining
talent. Moreover, the talent is attracted to "glamor" jobs. Top law
graduates flock to the Justice Department, the Defense Department,
and other loci of power and influence. They do not seek out the
Post Office, and even with the added attraction that a major reorganization might afford, they would not form lines at the hiring office.
The Post Office is not the White House. It is not at the center of
national policy, it makes little news, and it must therefore compete
219. Effective July I, 1968, the top salary in the Postal Field Service (grade PFS-21)
will be $27,900. H.R. 7977, § 3542, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Department is
limited to fifty-five employees in the top two PFS grades. Id. § 3301. (Positions at
Department headquarters in Washington are within the General Schedule and Execu•
tive Schedule pay rates.) The gap between executive-level salaries in the Civil Service
and those in private industry is documented in Hearings on H.R. 8261 and Related

Bills Before the Subcomm. on Compensation of the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-15, at 29-30, 36-37 (1967).
220. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATlSTICAL .AllSTRAcr OF THE UNITED
STAn:s 408-09 (1967).
221. See NATIONAL CML SERVICE LEAGUE, Poucy STATEMENT! ABANDONING PATRON·
AGE IN POSTAL APPOINTMENTS (1966).
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with private industry by paying competitive salaries and offering
comparable advancement opportunities. This it cannot do under the
present laws. As to nonmanagerial positions, the TVA example shows
that meaningful collective bargaining on wages and working conditions, together with a degree of flexibility in labor relations, can
assist in evoking a sense of participation and creating loyalty among
the entire work force, notwithstanding the government ban against
strikes. Perhaps this is not essential, but the importance of a joint
management-labor sense of mission during a period of upheaval and
change in technology cannot be overemphasized. Exemption from
civil service, subject to statutory requirements concerning merit
standards and due process in personnel administration, avoidance of
political interference, and the usual strike ban would facilitate
progress throughout the postal system.
3. Finance
It is in the area of finance-rate structure, capital expenditures,
borrowing, budgets, and auditing-that freedom of action tends to
be most critical and most controversial. It has regularly been assumed that postal rates are of such great national concern that they
can only be determined by Congress. That rate structures are of public concern is a truism; it does not follow, however, that Congress
should-or indeed, that Congress can-set a viable structure for postal
charges. The proposed postal corporation in England is to have statutory power to set rates, subject to applicable nationwide legislation
on prices and incomes, with provision for consultation with a users'
council on major rate changes. 222 Rates set by the corporation, though
considered by the users' council and subject to review by Parliament,
are therefore not originally set by the legislature. Similarly, United
States telephone rates, no less a matter of public interest than postal
charges, are established initially by the telephone companies, subject
to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission and local
utilities commissions. Clearly, no postal corporation could be allowed
to set rates without supervision; its monopoly position and the public
interest preclude such a scheme. But it is difficult to see what objection could be posed, on public interest grounds, to giving initiative
to the postal corporation to submit a rate structure, subject to modification by Congress on the basis of demonstrated public interest. Giving the corporation initial authority to set proposed rates-subject
to broad statutory guidelines on rate policy-thus has two virtues:
222. REORGANIZATION OF THE POST OFFICE, CMND.
COMMITTEE REPORT 195-97.

No. 3233, at 6·7 (1967); see SEU:cr
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it allows submission of a rate structure based on operational considerations, and it requires that Congress justify publicly any variation therefrom. If second-class mail rates, for example, are to be
maintained at a nonremunerative level by congressional intervention, Congress must make changes in the rates submitted by the
corporation and be prepared to justify those changes, together with
whatever losses--clearly identified as such-result therefrom.
Rates cannot be discussed without opening the problem of deficits, government investment, and break-even operations. The British
nationalized industries, TVA, and numerous other public corporations are directed to break even on their business-type operations
after repayment of a portion of the government's initial investment. 223
It has become commonplace to consider the Post Office a public
service that cannot fit within this framework; but interestingly, the
British Post Office operated within these strictures prior to the
corporation proposal and will continue to do so after the corporation is organized.224 Any decision that the Post Office will be subsidized means that some costs of using the mails will be borne not
by the users, but rather by the general public as a portion of tax
costs. Is this justified? The distribution of mail use suggests a resounding no to this question. First-class mail, which according to the Department's Cost Ascertainment System is not subsidized, is approximately seventy-five per cent business mail. Rate increases on this class
affect seriously neither individual nor business users. 225 Second-class
mail, heavily subsidized by any standard,226 is invariably passed on to
the consumer of newspapers and magazines that are mailed pursuant
to this class. Is there any reason why magazine readers should
pay for increased costs of paper and ink and labor-as they clearly
223. See text accompanying notes 114 &: 153 supra.
224. Postal operations, however, have produced deficits which have been offset by
profitable telephone services. POST OFFICE REPORT &: ACCOUNTS 40-41 (1965). It has been
recommended that separate financial objectives-each to require a return on investment-be established for postal and telephone services. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT
175-76.
225. See note 6 supra. Most companies spend between one-tenth and one-fifth of
one per cent of their operating expenses on first-class mail. Nonbusiness users spend an
average of only one-tenth of one per cent of per capita disposable income on firstclass mail. Even substantial rate increases should not, therefore, significantly affect the
users or the volume of first-class mail. l\IcKlNSEY &: Co., REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM.
ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE ON THE IMPACT OF POSTAL-RATE INCREASES 2-4,
2-7 (Comm. Print 1960).
226. See text accompanying note 46 supra. The new postal rates enacted by H.R.
7977, which increase cost coverages of all classes, still provide only 34% cost coverage
on regular second-class mail and 72% coverage on bulk third-class mail. It is difficult
to find a clear rationale in the congressional deliberations for the variations in cost
coverage, although 39 U.S.C. §§ 2301, 2302 (1964) provide general guidance on rates.
See S. REP. No. 801, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967).
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have-and not increases in postage charges?227 And is there any reason
to believe that the original rationale for the second-class subsidy,
facilitating the spread of news to remote areas by the only available
means, is still viable? Finally, it is difficult to understand why advertisers, the primary users of third-class mail, should not pay a fair
share of the cost of services rendered them.228 There is dispute as to
the validity of the Department's cost accumulations on third-class
mail,229 some suggesting that third-class mail does not even pay its
marginal costs. 230
Taken at its face, this evidence establishes that within broad ranges
postal rates can be adjusted without adversely affecting the system or
its users. The argument that the Post Office should not break even is
barren. The Department can break even, and there is no satisfactory
justification for preventing the costs of its services from rising when
all other costs rise. To the extent that there is genuine justification for
certain subsidies, such as free mail for the blind, they can as easily
be supported directly and identifiably by a lump-sum payment from
the Treasury. The advantage of break-even operations, which present
attainable goals to the Department and allow careful financial
analysis to play a role in operations, cannot be overestimated. This
reform must be rated as essential; if Congress continues to set rates
to produce a deficit, and the Department continues to take the blame
for a loss not of its mm making, the genuine incentive to maximize
efficiency in operations will forever be blunted.
Capital expenditures and borrowing power are related. It was
noted earlier that the Post Office's investment in research and development and in capital improvement is inordinately small.231 Failure
to make adequate investment in earlier periods saddles the postal
operations of today with outdated facilities. Inability to make substantial capital improvements derives from the appropriations pro227. Publishers have successfully passed on to subscribers significant increases in
other costs without substantial reduction in their profits, and with continued increases
in circulation. From 1946 to 1957, the average subscription price of magazines increased 44%, MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 225, at 2-12 through 2-17.
228. Postage is a significant part of the cost-nearly one-third-of direct mail advertising. Direct mail advertising, however, is at least ten times as expensive as advertising
in magazines or newspapers; its use is justified by its remarkable effectiveness. Raising
postage rates will affect only marginal operations: neither quantity of mail nor profits
of most users will be adversely affected by most postage rate increases. MCKINSEY & Co.,
supra note 225, at 2-24 through 2-35. Past experience with rate increases supports these
assertions. See Hearings on H.R. 7977 and H.R. 7978 Before the Subcomm. on Postal
Rates of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
90-14, at 21-22 (1967) (Statement of Postmaster General O'Brien).
229. Id. at 38-39. But see id. at 49.
230. E.g., M. BARATZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE POSTAL SERVICE 42-43 (1962).
231. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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cess: Congress has regularly failed to make substantial appropriations
for research and capital development, and the Department has
responded by expending little effort on developing such plans.232 The
historical lesson is that the system of appropriations for capital
development does not do the job. Moreover, it would be impossible
to accumulate substantial capital funds through increases in postal
rates, since any such increase would have to be so substantial as to
create a public outcry and congressional intervention into rate structures. The solution to this problem is straightfonvard and well-tried:
give the postal corporation authority to raise funds by the issuance
of bonds. TVA has such authority, and the bonds it issues-though
neither obligations of the United States, nor guaranteed by the Treasury-are highly rated securities.233 If the postal corporation is put
on a break-even footing, it may be possible, at least after some years
of favorable operations, for it to sell such bonds on its own credit,
without Treasury guaranty. 234 Provision must be made for coordination with the Treasury to prevent a substantial disturbance of fiscal
policy by the large issuance or retirement of debt at times when the
Treasury itself is engaged in open-market operations, but a statutory
scheme similar to TVA's bond-issuing authority seems a reasonable
compromise. 235 If the postal corporation is to be given a meaningful
charter to develop the postal system according to the latest technology, independence in capital financing, backed up with bond-issuing
authority, is essential.
Excessive control by the use of budgets and audits can negate the
impact of any attempted reorganization. This was the basis of TVA's
early dispute with the General Accounting Office.236 While TVA
must prepare and submit a budget, the statute specifically authorizes
it to spend receipts on its programs.237 By contrast, the Government
Corporation Control Act permits Congress, when approving a sub232. From 1955 to 1967 total postal modernization, including investments in land,
buildings, and mechanization, amounted to an average of less than $40 million per
year. Proposed expenditures for the five years beginning 1968, by contrast, amount to
$263 million annually. It remains to be seen whether Congress will appropriate such
amounts. Hearings on Postal Modernization Before the Subcomm. on Postal Facilities
and Modernization of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 90-17, pt. 1, at 34 (1967).
233. TVA bonds are rated Aaa, the highest rating, by Moody's. MOODY, Punuc
UTILITY MANUAL 1191-92 (1967).
234. But cf. REORGANIZATION OF THE Posr OFFICE, CMND. No. 3233, at 7 (1967),
permitting long-term borrowing by the new British postal corporation only from the
government. It is arguable that a Treasury guaranty might give the corporation the
benefit of lower interest rates.
2!15. See note 195 supra.
2!16. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
2!17. 16 U.S.C. § 8!1ly (1964).
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ject corporation's budget, to make changes therein: presumably, subsequent expenditures in violation thereof would be illegal.238 It
should be obvious that this authority, if applicable to a postal corporation, would leave open the possibility of regular intervention on
a political basis into locations of post offices, areas to be modernized,
and similar matters. While Congress must have ultimate control in
the national interest, it is not clear that such control must include
the right to change budget items not supported by appropriations in
the absence of special justification.
That audit authority can be equivalent to control is obvious to
long-time observers of the General Accounting Office. When expenditures are supported by appropriations, this control seems justified: Congress has no way to assure the integrity of the appropriation
process other than audit (and disallowance) by the General Accounting Office. That Office has been effective in carrying out this function,
although complaints have been heard that in so doing, it has often
presumed to pass on issues of internal policy beyond the area of its
expert competence. 239 However, when an organization finances its
operations through its own revenue-producing activities, as would
be the case with break-even operation of a postal corporation, the
function of assuring compliance with appropriation limits disappears
and disallowance of expense items by the General Accounting Office
becomes inappropriate. The only function of audit then becomes
evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation. Doubts
have been expressed concerning the General Accounting Office's
ability to perform such an audit, and it is true that many of its reports
are more in the nature of indictments than impartial observations.240
The Government Corporation Control Act makes abundantly clear
its approval of such fishing expeditions for possible flaws or inefficiencies:
[The audit report shall include] ... a report of any impairment of
capital noted in the audit and recommendations for the return of
such Government capital or the payment of such dividends as, in his
judgment, should be accomplished. The report shall also show
specifically any program, expenditure, or other financial transaction
238. See note 188 supra. Though the Act does not on its face give the Comptroller
General authority to disallow such expenditures, it is not altogether clear that he
would not claim such authority under appropriate circumstances, as the TVA-GAO
dispute demonstrated.
239. See, e.g., Beach, Role of the General Accounting Office in the Regulation of
Industry, 21 Bus. LAw. 235 (1965).
240. See H. MANSFIELD, THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 267-77 (1939); Pritchett, The
Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 AM. Pot. Ser. REV. 495, 502-05 (1946).
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or undertaking observed in the course of the audit, which, in the
opinion of the Comptroller General, has been carried on or made
without authority of law.241
Experience with General Accounting Office audits, albeit by government departments under the settlement authority,242 suggests that the
Comptroller General will stop at nothing in searching out details of
possible illegality or inefficiency, and that his audits are not intended
to indicate those aspects of operations that have been conducted
efficiently. Why audit by the General Accounting Office was specified
in the Government Corporation Control Act is difficult to understand
except as a means for exercising control, since the Office's primary
experience is with legality audits pursuant to departmental appropriations.243
Essential to an effective reform, therefore, is a business-type
budget not keyed to appropriation headings and not subject to detailed modification by Congress in the absence of some showing of
public interest. Clear exclusion from the disallowance authority of
the Comptroller General 244 is similarly essential. Audit by independent certified public accountants, though perhaps desirable, can
safely be foregone if the other protections listed above are assured.
V.

CONCLUSION

Evidence of the need for reorganizing the Post Office Department
is abundant. Without meaningful improvements, the Department
will experience increasing difficulty in performing its job of delivering the mails. It should be made quite clear that no miracles will
stem from the changes. There is substantial evidence to prove the
obvious conclusion that the effects of changes in organizations are
felt only after significant passage of time. 245 Moreover, the issue now
is not whether the Post Office ,rill suddenly be made a vigorous model
of governmental efficiency, but rather whether reorganization can
equip the Post Office to deal with the problems of the future.
It was noted earlier that incorporation of the Post Office of itself
would have little importance. It should now be evident that the
241. 31 u.s.c. § 851 (1964).
242. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
243. Audit by a firm of independent certified public accountants would bring objectivity and commercial experience to the examination. This, however, is precluded
by the Government Corporation Control Act. 31 U.S.C. § 866(d) (1964). See note 161

supra.

244. 31 u.s.c. §§ 71, 74 (1964).
245. See, e.g., R. LIKERT, THE HUMAN

ORGANIZATION

78-100 (1967).
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absence in any reorganization plan of certain critical elements, though
it may not render the plan entirely useless, will leave major impediments to the effective operation of the postal system. Reorganization
of the postal system as a corporation can have important symbolic
significance; it can represent a break with the past and a genuine attempt to infuse operations with new ideas. I make no pretense that
the proposed plan will not encounter major political roadblocks, but
if critical features are compromised now, the chance to remake the
Post Office may be lost for generations. And if a corporation is established without some genuine elements of autonomy, the effect may
be to perpetuate long-standing abuses in the name of reform.

